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2004 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 5-7, 2004  
 
 
Mark your calendar! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, as the major sponsor, 
along with the Ministry of the 
Attorney General Police Services 
and the Justice Institute of British Columbia will 
be hosting the "Police Leadership 2004 
Conference" April 5 to 7, 2004 at the Westin 
Bayshore in Vancouver, British Columbia.  
 
The conference will emphasize leadership as an 
activity, not a position, and provide an opportunity 
for participants of all ranks from police agencies 
across Canada, the United States, and beyond to 
involve themselves in leadership initiatives. A 
carefully chosen list of speakers will provide a 
first class opportunity to hear some of the 
world's outstanding authorities on leadership.  
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark: 
 
www.policeleadership.org 
 
JIBC LAUNCHES NEW  
WEBSITE 
 
The Justice Institute of British 
Columbia has updated its 
website. Included on this site is 
a new Police Academy link 
providing access to the “In 
Service: 10-8” Newsletter, 
training bulletins, course information, private 
security programs, and other related information. 
Log on at www.jibc.bc.ca and enjoy the surf. 
 
UNNECESSARY DETENTION 
RESULTS IN UNREASONABLE 
STRIP SEARCH 
R. v. S.F. & J.L., [2003] O.J. No. 92 
 
The police contacted the two 
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April 2003 young offender females (17 
years and 15 years old with no 
prior criminal history) at their 
omes, informed them that they were suspects in 
 robbery that occurred about a month earlier, 
nd asked that they turn themselves in. The girls 
ttended the police station with their parents and 
ere subsequently arrested for the robbery.  
ollowing arrest, both girls were separated from 
heir parents and taken before the officer in 
harge. The police had decided that the girls 
hould appear for a show cause hearing to be 
eleased on bail with conditions. As a 
onsequence, booking protocol required the girls 
e lodged in station cells before being 
ransported to the courthouse for the hearing.  
s part of the booking procedure, each girl was 
trip searched to determine whether they were 
ecreting weapons or contraband on their person. 
p until this point, no search, including a minimally 
ntrusive frisk search, had been conducted. The 
trip search was overseen by a female officer in 
n area designed to provide a measure of privacy 
nd only lasted about 5 minutes. The booking 
rocedure was captured on surveillance videotape 
hile the strip search was only partially shielded. 
he search screen intended to afford privacy was 
ot high enough and the girls’ breasts and upper 
odies were caught on tape. Nothing was found 
uring the search and the girls were lodged in 
eparate cells.  
 The girls brought an application under s.24(1) of 
the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings on the 
basis that the strip search violated their Charter 
rights including the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure under s.8. The 
Crown argued that there were no Charter 
breaches and the application should be dismissed.  
 
Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
 
Since there was no warrant for the strip 
searches, the Crown bore the burden of 
satisfying the court that the search was 
nonetheless reasonable. Justice Katarynych of 
the Ontario Court of Justice recognized that at 
common law the police may strip search a person 
incidental to an arrest if the following criteria 
are met: 
 
• there was a lawful arrest (the police had 
reasonable grounds); 
• the search is truly incidental (or connected) to 
the arrest; 
• the police have reasonable grounds to justify 
the strip search; and 
• the strip search is conducted in a reasonable 
manner. 
 
Lawful Arrest 
 
The accused conceded that the arrest was 
proper. 
 
Search Incidental to Arrest 
 
The police may only search as an incident to 
arrest if the search is connected to the reason of 
the arrest for the purpose of discovering and 
recovering evidence or weapons. Furthermore, the 
officer need not have an independent reasonable 
belief that weapons or evidence will be found. 
Instead, the search power derives from the fact 
of arrest. In this case, the search was not made 
to find evidence connected to the robbery.  The 
robbery had occurred almost a month earlier. 
However, the police were concerned with safety. 
Justice   Katarynych wrote: 
 
It was, in short, a concern about safety; safety of 
the girls themselves while they were in detention, 
safety of others with whom they might come into 
contact, and the safety of the police 
themselves.  It is obviously in the interests of 
police and of society as a whole to ensure that 
persons who are detained are not armed with items 
that can be used to harm themselves or others.  
 
The information in the hands of the investigating 
officer bearing on the alleged robbery included 
allegations that the complainant had been injured 
in the robbery, that she had had lotion sprayed in 
her hair when her CD player was forcibly taken 
from her, that she was afraid of these girls, that 
the incident had occurred near a high school, that 
it had "gang" overtones, although it was not known 
definitively whether these two girls were members 
of a gang.  If that information proved true, there 
was reason for the police to believe that each girl 
presented a risk of harm to the complainant and 
potentially to others in the community.  That 
potential risk was, in fact, the reason underlying 
the decision of the investigating officer, accepted 
by the arresting officers and not questioned by 
the officer in charge, to seek a surety bail for 
each girl, one with a hefty penal sum and conditions 
governing them pending trial or other resolution of 
the charge.  
 
In that sense, the objective of the search 
(discovery of weapons) was connected to the 
reason for the arrest (a violent crime).  
 
Grounds Justifying a Strip Search 
 
Justice Katarynych was very critical of the police 
decision to detain the girls that triggered the 
policy on strip searches. In his view, there was no 
justification for the detention to show cause and 
therefore no justification for the strip search. 
He held: 
 
This strip search was inextricably bound up with 
the decision of the officers to lodge these girls in 
the cells.  
 
The single focus on the charge unleashed a chain 
of thinking that went something like this: - 
robbery charge means no release without a show 
cause hearing; no release means detention in the 
station cells; any person detained presents a risk 
that can only be contained by a strip search; 
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 therefore, lodging in the station cells requires 
strip search.  
 
I accept, as a matter of common sense, that police 
cells and police paddy wagon transport are 
environments that need to be kept freed of 
weapons or contraband for the safety of those 
imprisoned, and those coming in contact with them, 
and that the safety issues are no less for a person 
detained waiting a bail hearing than they are for 
any other person in custody.  
 
The difficulty in this case is that these two young 
girls were swept into a policy and attitude that 
took no meaningful account of whether their 
particular circumstances presented a level of risk 
at all.  
 
On the evidence in this voire dire, I could find no 
justification for lodging these girls in the cells at 
all, and since it was that particular lodging that 
triggered the "need" for a strip search, nothing 
with which to reasonably ground a belief that a 
strip search needed of either girl to guarantee the 
safety of the police, the two girls themselves or 
others detained in the station or at the 
courthouse.  
 
I was frankly puzzled that the police officers 
detained these two girls in the station pending 
their court appearance on this charge.  No 
authority was cited for the proposition that the 
charge of robbery created some sort of "reverse 
onus" situation for these youths that required 
them to displace a presumption that they would be 
detained.  
 
In the judge’s opinion, the two girls could have 
been released to their parents and remained with 
them in the station conference room or the 
reception area to pass the time until the 
afternoon sitting of the court. Thus, the strip 
search could have been avoided altogether. 
Justice Katarynych continued: 
 
In choosing the more onerous manner of detention, 
the officers knew that they had activated both 
the need to keep the cells safe from these girls 
and all the "rules" governing safety in custodial 
facilities.  This was a safety issue that the police 
officers themselves created by their choice to 
bypass any less onerous method of bringing these 
girls before the court.  
 
In sum, there was no justification for the strip 
search in this case because there was no 
justification for the detention that triggered it.  
 
Even if there had been, this search veered outside 
the boundaries required by the common law for 
searches of this level of intrusion.  
 
The common law requires reasonable and probable 
grounds for the level of search selected by the 
police.  The more intrusive the search, the greater 
the degree of justification needed to hold it within 
the scope of s. 8 of the Charter.  
 
The choice of strip search emerged from a deeply 
rooted belief on the part of all the station 
officers involved with these girls, including the 
officer in charge who had responsibility for the 
search decision, that it is the only reasonable and 
effective way to uncover weapons and contraband 
concealed on the person of detainees.  
 
It was "red alert" and "worst case scenario" 
philosophy that fed the decision with regard to 
this particular search.  The thoroughness of a 
search mattered to these officers.  All of them 
acted in a genuinely held belief that a strip search 
was the only meaningful and responsible way to 
ensure their own safety, the safety of the girls 
themselves and others in custody with whom they 
would come in contact until their release.  
 
And further 
 
There is no doubt, as all of the officers testified, 
that a strip search is far more effective in 
locating weapons and contraband than a frisk or 
pat-down of the person's clothed 
body.  Effectiveness is not, however, the only 
consideration that can be permitted to drive police 
thinking, when the issue is an intrusion of a 
person's privacy.  
 
The nature of the offence with which an accused is 
charged is an important consideration, as the 
Crown properly points out.  Safety in custodial 
facilities, whether station cell, transport wagon or 
courthouse cell is also an important consideration.  
 
Yet an informed exercise of discretion cannot end 
there.  A spectre of foreboding and fear cannot be 
allowed to overwhelm both the ability and the 
motivation of the officers to fix their attention on 
factors specific to the person upon whom their 
decision is to be visited.  
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 In the Court’s opinion, there were no reasonable 
grounds to believe that either accused posed a 
safety concern. The police response did not 
reflect the specific circumstances that existed 
and the strip search was completely unnecessary. 
Thus, the search was unreasonable. 
 
Reasonable Manner 
 
Justice Katarynych also found that the manner in 
which the search was conducted unreasonable. 
Firstly, no pat-down search was conducted prior 
to the strip search. This left the girls more 
vulnerable than necessary because a frisk search 
may have been sufficient to address police 
concerns. Without it, the means to ascertain 
whether there was in fact a need for a more 
intrusive search was bypassed. Secondly, a 
portion of their naked body was captured on 
videotape, which resulted in “excruciating 
embarrassment”.  
 
The Court granted the application and the 
robbery charges were stayed. 
 
ROADSIDE DETENTION & 
VEHICLE SEARCH LAWFUL 
R. v. Hunter, 2003 SKPC 18 
 
A police investigator received 
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asked for his driver’s licence and vehicle 
registration. An exterior and interior vehicle 
standards check was conducted and at one point 
the accused was asked to exit his vehicle to allow 
the officer to get inside. Immediately upon 
entering the car, the officer smelled an odour of 
marihuana.  
 
The emergency break was found to be broken and 
the officer continued his check through the 
remainder of the vehicle for about five minutes. 
The officer concluded he could smell unburned 
marihuana and told the accused. He was arrested 
and a police dog searched the car. Police found 
636 grams of marihuana in a bag behind the 
passenger seat. At his trial in Saskatchewan 
Provincial Court on a charge of possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking the 
accused argued, in part, that his right to be 
secure from unreasonable search and seizure 
under s.8 of the Charter had been violated and 
the evidence should be excluded under s.24(2).  
 
The Detention 
 
Although the accused did not argue that his right 
under s.9 of the Charter to be free from 
arbitrary detention had been violated, Justice 
Carter nonetheless addressed the issue. Under 
s.40(8) of Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act, 
V
Aconfidential information from a 
reliable source that the accused 
would be driving a 4-door Ford 
empo from Prince Albert to Saskatoon to pick up 
 large quantity of marihuana. Surveillance was 
stablished on the accused and he was observed 
riving into Saskatoon, attend a residence empty-
anded, exit with a white bag, and then enter his 
ar and leave the city.  The police investigator 
anted uniformed officers to stop the accused, 
nd either attempt to gather more grounds to 
earch or obtain his consent.  
 check-stop program in operation was moved 
nto the highway where he could be intercepted.  
he accused, operating a vehicle with one burnt 
ut headlight, was waved over to the side of the 
oad after he arrived at the check-stop. He was 
identifiable police officers are entitled to stop 
drivers of motor vehicles while in the lawful 
execution of their duties. If the stop in this case 
had been truly random, the officer at the check-
stop would only be entitled to investigate things 
related to highway traffic safety; investigative 
purposes or searches unrelated to traffic safety 
would not be allowed.  
 
However, the stop in this case was not random. 
The entire check-stop had been moved “to set a 
net to catch” the accused. The check-stop officer 
was part of a criminal investigation and he had an 
articulable cause (unrelated to highway safety) 
based on information he received from the 
investigator. As a result, the stop (detention) was 
not arbitrary.  
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 The Search 
 
Although every warrantless search is prima facie 
unreasonable, the Crown successfully rebutted 
the presumption in this case. Justice Carter, 
relying on previous Saskatchewan case law1, noted 
the following prerequisites of a lawful search 
absent a warrant: 
 
• a lawful detention; 
• reasonable grounds to believe an offence has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed 
and that the search will disclose evidence 
relevant to that offence; 
• exigent circumstances render a warrant 
unfeasible; and 
• the scope of the search is reasonable with 
respect to the offence suspected and the 
evidence sought. 
 
Having already found the detention lawful, 
Justice Carter examined whether the check-stop 
officer had the required reasonable grounds. In 
his view the officer had the necessary reasonable 
grounds based on information provided to him by 
the investigating officer. He simply could have 
waived the accused over at the moment he saw 
him and began a search. However, he instead 
chose to do what he normally does at a check-
stop. Once he was certain he smelled unburned 
marihuana, he arrested and searched. With 
respect to exigent circumstances, the Court 
stated: 
 
Exigent circumstances did exist in this case. The 
evidence before this court is that telewarrants are 
not available for searches of this nature. Requiring 
[the investigating officer] to obtain a written 
warrant to search the accused in these 
circumstances would have taken amazing logistical 
gymnastics and might very well have resulted in 
the evidence being removed from the car and 
distributed amongst others or hidden.    
 
The scope of the search was also reasonable. It 
“was quick and efficient.” A police dog was used 
and the car was not dismantled. As well, “the 
accused was [not] strip searched or otherwise 
publicly degraded on the highway.”  
                                                 
                                                
1 R. v. D.(I.D.) (1987) 38 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.K.C.A.) 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
REVIEW 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Section 10(b) of the Charter provides persons 
arrested or detained with the right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed 
of that right. The police obligations imposed by 
s.10(b)2 include clearly and properly informing the 
person by a method of communication and in 
terms the person can understand at a time they 
are capable of understanding that they have the 
right to retain and instruct (obtain) counsel of 
without delay and of the existence and availability 
of Legal Aid and duty counsel. If there are special 
circumstances suggesting a diminished capacity or 
lack of understanding, such as shock, 
drunkenness, or mental deficiency, further 
explanation is required. 
 
If the person chooses to exercise their right to 
counsel they must be provided the opportunity to 
exercise the right without delay and to retain 
counsel of their choice. This may require assisting 
the person in their efforts to obtain a lawyer and 
includes ensuring privacy. Furthermore, the police 
must stop eliciting evidence prior to affording 
them the reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct counsel. If the person is not diligent, this 
"holding off" obligation is waived 
 
The Crown has the burden of establishing that 
the person who invoked their right to counsel was 
provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact 
counsel.  The person has the burden of 
establishing that they were reasonably diligent in 
the exercise of their right. If the person was not 
reasonably diligent then the implementational 
duties of s.10(b) do not arise or will be 
suspended3 and the police may continue with their 
investigation. 
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2 See for example R. v. Luong (2000) 149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p.574-575. 
3 R. v. Luong (2000) 149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p.575. 
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 CONSENT SEARCH 
REQUIRES MORE THAN 
COMPLIANCE WITH 
DEMAND 
R. v. Ciancio, 2003 BCPC 0023 
 
A police officer pulled over an 
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search and seizure were breached. Conversely, 
the Crown submitted that the initial search was 
lawful because it was consentual. Moreover, once 
the consent was withdrawn the continued search 
was justified for officer safety when the 
accused’s demeanour changed in reaction to the 
unlatching and opening of the compartment. 
 
British Columbia Provincial Court Justice Gove 
V
Aout of province vehicle to check 
if the accused had a valid 
driver’s licence and whether the 
ehicle was properly insured. At the time of the 
top there were no reasonable grounds to believe 
ny offence had been committed. The accused 
roduced a valid Alberta driver’s licence but the 
ehicle, registered to a limited company, had 
nsurance which expired four days earlier. The 
ehicle was not reported stolen and the officer 
alled for back-up, wrote an insurance offence 
icket, and called for a tow truck.  
xpressing a concern over responses provided to 
is questions that the accused was not in lawful 
ossession of the vehicle, the officer asked if he 
ould conduct a “voluntary search” of the trunk to 
ook for papers or documents related to the 
ccused’s possession of the vehicle.  Upon 
emand, the accused opened the trunk with a key. 
lothing, a framed print, and cellular telephone 
quipment were noted in the trunk, but not 
earched. However, the officer opened a latched 
ompartment and saw what appeared to be a 
aytimer in a zipped case.  
he accused stated it was his, said “You don’t 
eed to see that. I don’t like this”, and reached 
or it. He was stopped and the police found a 
istol and magazine with rounds in the daytimer. 
he accused was arrested, the items were placed 
ack in the trunk, the vehicle was towed to the 
olice detachment, and a warrant was obtained 
or the vehicle. 
uring the voire dire to determine the 
dmissibility of the pistol, magazine, and rounds, 
he accused argued that his rights under s.8 of 
he Charter to be secure against unreasonable 
found the initial stopping of the vehicle 
authorized under British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle 
Act to determine whether the driver had a valid 
licence and also to check if the driver was 
properly insured. The expired insurance also 
justified the impounding of the car until valid 
insurance could be obtained.  However, the search 
that followed was unreasonable. Justice Gove was 
not satisfied that the officer was able to 
articulate why he wanted to legally search the 
vehicle. His reasons, to search for other 
insurance documents or any papers with the 
accused’s name connecting him to the car, were 
speculative at best. The vehicle was not reported 
stolen and it was going to be impounded. A 
telephone call to the registered owner was the 
“simplest solution” to resolve the officer’s 
concern.  
 
Nor was consent to search valid. For a consent 
search to be lawful the consent must be voluntary 
and the person must be aware of the 
consequences in giving it. In this case the accused 
was not told he had a choice in allowing the search 
nor was he informed of the possible 
consequences. Further, Justice Gove stated: 
 
[The officer] told the accused to unlock the trunk. 
Compliance with a demand cannot be taken as 
consent. Inside the constable saw clothing, a 
framed print and cellular telephone equipment. If 
the police constable was looking for evidence tying 
the accused to the motor vehicle, I would have 
thought that he would have searched through some 
of these items, in particular the clothes. He did 
not. Instead, he seems to have gone almost 
immediately to the latched door to the 
compartment on the side of the trunk. Inside he 
found the zipped daytimer. Any belief on behalf of 
olume 3 Issue 3 
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 the officer that the search was by consent was 
clearly withdrawn when the accused asserted his 
right to privacy of the contents of the daytimer. 
 
Officer safety concerns were also insufficient to 
justify the search.  The Court held: 
 
[The constable] testified that he took the 
daytimer and opened it due to his concern for his 
safety, and safety of the other officer…. This was 
due to the accused's change of demeanour. He said 
that the accused went from somewhat compliant 
and cooperative to now asserting his rights to 
privacy. 
 
The Crown submits that officer safety from this 
point on justified the continued search. It is not 
for the court to second-guess as to whether [the 
constable] was justified, from a safety point of 
view, in taking and opening the daytimer due to his 
concerns about safety. Police officers often face 
dangers and are given latitude in recognition of 
this. 
 
The constable's determination that there was a 
safety issue due to the accused's change in 
demeanour, cannot and does make a search that 
was otherwise not lawful into one that is now 
justified, such that property found as a result of 
the search becomes not the result of an illegal 
search, but somehow the result of searching for 
officer safety. 
 
At the time that [the constable] was searching the 
trunk of the motor vehicle, he had no articulable 
reason to do so. He did not have lawful consent 
from the accused, and he was violating the 
accused's rights to be free from an arbitrary 
search. He is not to be criticized for seizing the 
daytimer once he came upon it, if he felt that his 
safety was at risk, but the officer safety concerns 
cannot convert the non-consensual and unlawful 
search into a lawful one. There is a distinction 
between what the officer did for safety and 
whether the accused's rights were violated. 
 
As a result of this serious violation to the 
accused’s s.8 rights, the evidence was ruled 
inadmissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.provinicalcourt.bc.ca  
 
‘PRIORITY ONE’ CALL 
JUSTIFIES WARRANTLESS 
ENTRY 
R. v. Brown, 2003 BCCA 141 
 
The police received a 911 
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April 2003 “priority one” call from a 
payphone located across the 
street from a hotel that a man 
ad been stabbed and that there was a man with 
 gun in either room 201 or 202.  However, the 
nformation could not be confirmed. Two police 
fficers responded and were told by the hotel 
esk clerk that room 201 was occupied, but room 
02 was vacant.  
ith handguns drawn, the officers attended 
oom 201, knocked, and announced their presence. 
he accused opened the door and was taken into 
ustody. Although the room was small and the 
olice could see no one else in the room that 
onstituted a threat, they testified they entered 
o check for injured persons, look for weapons, 
igns of struggle, blood, or other evidence of a 
rime. Once inside, an officer saw drugs on a bed. 
ontinuing his search, the officer found more 
rugs in a partially open dresser drawer.  
he accused was subsequently charged with 
ossession of a controlled substance for the 
urpose of trafficking. The trial judge concluded 
hat the “police would have been remiss in their 
uty had they not entered the room to look for 
omeone who may have been stabbed and whose 
ife might have been in jeopardy”.  A warrant was 
ot necessary to enter and the 52 flaps of heroin 
nd 150 flaps of cocaine were found in plain view. 
is submission that his s.8 Charter right to be 
ecure from unreasonable search was breached 
as rejected and he was convicted.  
he accused appealed to the British Columbia 
ourt of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial 
udge erred in finding the entry and search of 
he room lawful. Although the accused conceded 
hat the police were acting in the course of their 
8
 general duty to protect life, that duty was 
discharged when they looked into the room and 
determined there was no one else present. He 
contended that when the police discovered the 
drugs they were exceeding the scope of their 
protective duty and were then engaged in a 
secondary search for evidence, which required a 
warrant.  
 
In rejecting the accused’s submission, Justice 
Smith writing for the unanimous British Columbia 
Court of Appeal stated: 
 
I am not persuaded that the trial judge 
misapprehended the evidence or that he erred in 
failing to treat these events as two discrete 
searches of the room for different purposes.  The 
dispatch call upon which the police officers were 
acting suggested that the reported activity was 
occurring in either Room 201 or 202.  I do not 
think that it can reasonably said in the 
circumstances that the officers had completed the 
execution of their general duty to protect life 
until they had satisfied themselves that there was 
no potentially dangerous assailant nor any injured 
victim in either of the rooms or in any place nearby 
to which their investigation of the two rooms 
might have led them.  In my view, the evidence 
supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
officers were justified in entering Room 201 for 
the purposes that they described in their 
testimony.  Those purposes were within the scope 
of their general duty to protect life and their 
actions were, accordingly, authorized by law.  The 
suggestion that there were two separate searches 
for different purposes is an artificial one in the 
circumstances.  
 
The accused’s conviction was upheld and the 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“There are not enough jails, not enough policemen, 
not enough courts to enforce a law not supported 
by the people.” Hubert H. Humphrey 
 
‘JUST’ICE OR NOT? IT’S 
ALL IN THE MEANING OF A 
WORD 
R. v. Polischuk, 2003 BCPC 0076 
 
A police officer following a 
pickup truck at 1:00 am from one 
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April 2003 trailer park to another noted it 
did not signal at an intersection. 
He lost sight of it but found it 
arked in a driveway at the second trailer park 12 
inutes later. The officer stayed in the area and 
 minutes later the truck left the trailer park 
nd drove past the police car. The officer again 
ollowed and observed the truck being driven 
elow the speed limit and swaying in its lane. The 
ruck was stopped and the police officer dealt 
ith the accused  driver.  
he accused told the officer, “I have a dying 
ister and I’ve just had a couple of drinks”. The 
fficer did not ask when the accused had his last 
rink, although he knew that he must wait 10 to 
5 minutes after someone’s last drink before 
dministering a test or otherwise a false failure 
ould occur as a result of residual mouth alcohol. 
he roadside screening test was administered 
nd the accused failed. This provided reasonable 
rounds and the officer pursued an impaired 
riving investigation. Without the failure, the 
fficer testified there would have been no 
harges. 
uring a voire dire challenging the roadside 
creening test as a violation of the accused’s s.8 
earch and seizure Charter right, he argued that 
he officer should have clarified the meaning of 
he word “just “ in “I’ve just had a couple of 
rinks”. British Columbia Provincial Court Justice 
recknell noted that the term “just” could either 
ave temporal significance as in, “It was just a 
ew minutes ago”, or quantifying significance as 
n, “There are just two of them”. If the word 
just” was meant to mean recently, the roadside 
creening device failure would be unreliable and 
ould not elevate the officer’s suspicion to 
9
 reasonable grounds. In accepting the accused’s 
argument that the officer failed to make further 
enquiries over the word “just”, the Court held: 
 
The police officer knew that the vehicle had been 
parked within the 10 or 15 minute time frame 
immediately prior to obtaining the test from the 
defendant. There was no evidence called as to what 
the defendant was or was not doing in that 
residence for that period of time. But given his 
answer or his statement to the police, "I have a 
dying sister and I just had a couple of drinks," in 
my view, and I conclude that the [officer] when 
presented with that statement, combined with the 
fact that he saw the pick-up truck parked, should 
have put him on notice, on an objective basis, to 
make further inquiries as to whether or not the 
word "just" meant just as in time, "a few minutes 
ago, I just had a few drinks," or just as to amount, 
"I just had two drinks." 
 
 
His failure to do so and to make that inquiry may 
have allowed him to form a subjective opinion, but 
does not meet what I conclude should have been 
done to maintain necessity for coming to an 
objective conclusion on the matter. 
 
In my view, the roadside screening device test 
results should not be admissible, and from that I 
draw, at least from what Crown has said to this 
point, that without that test result, the [officer] 
had no reasonable or probable grounds to proceed 
further with the investigation. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
X-PLORING X-PECTATIONS OF 
GENERATION-X 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Introduction 
 
As today’s workforce ‘evolves’ 
across generational lines, new 
limited labour force while at the same time retain 
existing employees. Leaders must recognize the 
differences among the generations that make up 
their work force. Effectively leading generation 
Xers will require learning “what they want, how 
they feel, and how they view their world”4. By 
understanding the generations, an effective 
leader can modify their approach to the worker, 
tap the worker’s capacities, and develop their 
strengths. This article will focus largely on 
generation X workers and offer some 
understanding of how to shepherd them in the 
workplace.  
 
Generational Generalizations 
 
The Encarta World English 
Dictionary5 defines a generation 
as “all people who were born at 
approximately the same time, 
considered as a group, and 
especially when considered as 
having shared interests and attitudes”. In today’s 
workforce there are four generations working 
along side each other, although the exact 
generational dates differ among authors: 
veterans, baby boomers, generation X, and 
generation Y. As a leader in contemporary 
organizational life, it is important to understand 
each generation. It is also important to remember 
however, that these are only generalizations of 
each group. Painting all persons with the same 
brush who fall within the birth ranges identified 
could be a disservice to the individual and the 
organization. With this in mind, what follows is a 
brief ‘bio’ of each generation. 
 
Veterans, ‘traditionalists’, or 
the ‘silent generation’, are 
those persons born between 
the early 1920s and 19456. 
V
Aleadership techniques are 
necessary to manage an 
organization effectively. In 
today’s market it is necessary 
to successfully compete for a 
olume 3 Issue 3 
pril 2003 This generation was formed 
                                                 
4 Nagle, Terri. (1999). Coaching generation X. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.coachingandmentoring.com/Articles/x’s.html [2002, November 23] at 
para. 5. 
5 Encarta World English Dictionary (2002). [On-line] Available: 
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary.html [2002, November 24] 
6 Hood, Sarah. (2000). Generational diversity in the workplace. HR Professional. 
17(3), 19-21. 
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 during the great depression and World War I. 
They are considered hard working company 
loyalists who are detail oriented and are closely 
reaching retirement7. “They value hard work, law 
and order and respect for authority”8. In policing, 
this generation will soon largely be extinct, since 
many collective labour agreements have 
mandatory retirement at age 60.   
 
 
  
Baby boomers, or ‘boomers’, are 
those born between 1945 and 
19659. Boomers grew up in the 
age of the Civil Rights and 
women’s movements, the 
Vietnam War, and the sexual revolution. Boomers 
live to work and, as a result, define themselves 
through their work10. They “tend to be most 
comfortable working within a chain of command 
and expect promotions after years of hard 
work”11. They are comfortable with the immediate 
and familiar, while they struggle with change. 
 
Generation X, ‘baby busters’, 
‘13th generation’, or ‘twenty 
somethings’, are those born 
between 1965 and 198012. They 
saw their parents getting 
divorced and working late hours 
while they became the generation known as ‘latch 
key kids’. They are at ease and comfortable with 
technology and change, and are shaped by 
specialized knowledge13. Video games, television, 
and computers were a staple in their lives. As a 
result, they became more independent than 
previous generations and more adaptive to change.  
                                                 
                                                
7 Hood, Sarah. (2000). Generational diversity in the workplace. HR Professional. 
17(3), 19-21. 
8 Commitment [Homepage]. How veterans, baby boomers, generation Xers and 
generation nexters can all get along in the workplace. [On-line]. Available: 
http://commitment.com/getalong.html [2002, November 23] at para. 3. 
9 Hood, Sarah. (2000). Generational diversity in the workplace. HR Professional. 
17(3), 19-21. 
10 Brown, Robert M., LeMaster, Leslie, and Swisher, Steve. (2001) Training the 
correctional work force of today and tomorrow. Corrections Today. 120-121 
11 Ruch, Will. (2000) How to keep gen X employees from becoming x-employees. 
Training and Development. 54(4), 40-43 at p.42. 
12 Scott, Oreen. (2002). Baby boomers and generation-x in the workplace. [On-line] 
Available: http://www.oreenscott.com/baby_boomers.htm [2002, November 23], 
Alexander, Amy. (2002). Generation x: Love ‘em or they might leave ya. [On-line] 
Available: http://www.businessreport.com/pub/20_20/aalexander. [2002, 
November 23], Hacker, Carol A. (2002). Recruiting and retaining “generation Y and 
X” employees. [On-line] Available: http://www.chartcourse.com/articlegenx 
hacker.html [20002, November 21], Hood, Sarah. (2000). Generational diversity in 
the workplace. HR Professional. 17(3), 19-21 at p.20, Brown, Robert M., LeMaster, 
Leslie, and Swisher, Steve. (2001) Training the correctional work force of today 
and tomorrow. Corrections Today. 120-121 
13 Ruch, Will. (2000) How to keep gen X employees from becoming x-employees. 
Training and Development. 54(4), 40-43. 
 
Generation Y, ‘Nexters’, or 
‘Millennials’ are those persons 
born since 1980. They are 
growing up in a world defined by 
school violence, diversity, and TV 
talk shows14. Bismark State 
College15 describes this optimistic and confident 
generation as being ‘education minded’, with 
feedback and praise as motivating factors in their 
work life.  
 
Since the majority of the police labour force is 
comprised of baby boomers and generation Xers, 
the remaining discussion will focus of these two 
generations. 
 
Comparing / Contrasting Generation-X 
with Baby Boomers 
 
Boomers enjoy the status quo, place loyalty to the 
organization as a premier value, and are 
uncomfortable with change. Generation Xers are 
“more global, technologically oriented, and 
culturally diverse than the generations before 
them”16. This bodes well for police organizations 
because offenders are becoming more 
technologically savvy and global. Police 
organizations will need generation Xers to utilize 
their skills in combatting cyber and other 
similarly sophisticated crimes. They are 
“adaptable, independent, creative and techno-
literate. They are not at all intimidated by 
authority, which makes them able to cope with a 
high level of responsibility. However, their people 
skills are less developed than those of the 
Boomer generation”17. Carol Hacker18 argues that 
 
14 Commitment [Homepage]. How veterans, baby boomers, generation Xers and 
generation nexters can all get along in the workplace. [On-line]. Available: 
http://commitment.com/getalong.html [2002, November 23]  
15 Bismark State College. (2001). Generations in the workplace: The Challenge and 
Opportunities. Training Tips and Techniques. Vol 2 Issue 4. 
16 Lankard, Bettina A. (1995). Career development and generation X. [On-line] 
Available: http://ericacve.org/docs/genx.htm. [2002, November 11] at para. 1. 
17 Hood, Sarah. (2000). Generational diversity in the workplace. HR Professional. 
17(3), 19-21 at p.20. 
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 generation Xers are self-described “free spirits”. 
They are able to multi task, seek new challenges, 
and thrive for recognition of their abilities. 
Bettina Lankard19 describes generation X as 
follows: 
 
This generation is concerned about having a 
balanced life. They are not workaholics and believe 
in compartmentalizing their work, social, and family 
lives. Their outside interests are as important to 
them as their jobs….They are more realistic about 
the balance between their work and family/social 
lives that will give them satisfaction and make 
them happy. 
 
However, generation X is often described by the 
boomers as “lazy, hostile, uneducated, anti-
authority, apathetic couch potatoes”20. Pam 
Wyess21 describes generation X as having the 
“why” chromosome; constantly questioning what is 
done. When given a direction, generation Xers no 
longer reply “Yes Sir!”, but “Why Sir?”. This 
questioning can be perceived by members of the 
command and control model (the traditional 
paradigm of policing) as challenging authority or a 
sign of disrespect. Generation Xers also take a 
holistic, or ‘big picture’, approach to 
understanding an organization. “They are less 
likely to accept a ‘because I said so’ attitude from 
a supervisor”22. Unlike ‘blind’ boomers, who can be 
characterized by blind trust, blind faith, and 
blind acceptance in organizational status quo, 
Xers question and examine the status quo, only 
accepting what they believe is useful and 
appropriate to their context.  Again, this can be 
seen as a lack of respect for, or insubordination 
towards, authority. 
 
                                                                               
                                                
18 Hacker, Carol A. (2002). Recruiting and retaining “generation Y and X” employees. 
[On-line] Available: http://www.chartcourse.com/articlegenxhacker.html [20002, 
November 21] 
19 Lankard, Bettina A. (1995). Career development and generation X. [On-line] 
Available: http://ericacve.org/docs/genx.htm. [2002, November 11] at para. 11. 
20 Aguilar, Dahlia. (1993). Boom or bust? Hispanic. 6(4), 20-23 at p.20. 
21 Wyess, Pam. (2001). Understanding the new breed of cop: Generation x in 
policing. [On-line] Available: http://63.238.99.136/le_newsstand_5GenXtraits.asp 
[2002, November 23] 
22 Smith, Gregory. (2002). How to manage generation x employees. [On-line] 
Available: http://www.chartcourse.com/articlegenx.html [2002, November 21] at 
para. 4. 
Leadership Appreciated by Generation X 
Compared to Boomers 
 
Gregory Smith23 suggests that baby boomers 
have developed in a traditional workplace defined 
by job security and loyalty to the organization. 
Promotions are based on longevity and ‘time 
served’. Respect is attained by position or rank 
and action is taken only with direction. These are 
also the characteristics of any paramilitary 
organization, such as the police. Police 
departments are highly regulated with policy and 
procedure and have a thoroughly delineated rank 
structure.  
 
Although this may have worked in the ‘controlling’ 
environment of the traditional workplace, police 
leaders must look beyond this status quo if they 
seek to effectively manage across generational 
lines. Generation X employees, on the other hand, 
gain security from within and are loyal to 
themselves, believe promotions should be based 
on performance, challenge authority, and feel 
respect should be earned24. The regulation and 
hierarchy enjoyed by boomers can be viewed by 
Xers as too constrictive, stifling the innovation 
and creativity that motivates them. 
 
The X generation does not trust the organization 
or chain of command. They “tend to be less 
accepting of traditional hierarchy and traditional 
approaches to management”25. They grew up 
seeing their parents lose their jobs through 
restructuring, downsizing, and recession. 
However, unlike many private organizations and 
the recent layoffs in the public sector, Xers can 
find some comfort, although it is not necessarily 
important to them, that police departments today 
still offer job security because of a deluge in 
retirements.  
 
 
23 Smith, Gregory. (2002). Baby boomer versus generation x managing the new 
workforce. [On-line] Available: http://www.businessknowhow.com/manage/genx.htm 
[2002, November 23] 
24 Smith, Gregory. (2002). Baby boomer versus generation x managing the new 
workforce. [On-line] Available: http://www.businessknowhow.com/manage/genx.htm 
[2002, November 23] 
25 Conference Board of Canada. (2002). Developing business leaders for 2010. 
Conference Board Inc. 
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 Generation Xers believe in and trust themselves 
above the organization. They believe in 
promotions through merit and performance, not 
tenure. They do not respond well to 
micromanagement, preferring to be given an 
objective with the freedom to innovate and 
create to meet that objective. Gamonal and 
Williams26 contend that generation Xers spurn 
micromanaging while at the same time loathe 
managers who ‘cave in’ arbitrarily to every 
request of the worker, including requests in the 
Xers best interest.  
 
Smith27 also suggests that leaders of generation 
Xers must “take time to be personal”. They must 
build relationships with individual workers and 
encourage innovation. Personal recognition and job 
satisfaction are what drives these workers. They 
seek personal growth and knowledge, with the 
premier benefit from an organization being 
development and training28. 
 
Rationale for Transition 
 
Why care about the generational attitudes within 
the workplace? The hard, cold reality is that 
police organizations cannot afford to ignore the 
new workforce. There is little doubt that police 
leaders must transition their style in managing 
the X generation. Never has the need to attract 
qualified recruits into policing been so important. 
Not only are police departments competing for a 
limited labour force with industry, they are 
competing with each other for the same pool of 
applicants. Today’s leaders must also address 
employees who demand appraisal based on 
qualifications, not tenure.  
 
Employee morale and enjoyment at the workplace, 
which translates into a more productive 
workforce, must be addressed by leaders. This is 
not to suggest that leaders must change their 
entire leadership style to accommodate the 
generation X worker. Much like situational 
leadership, leaders must develop a form of 
“generational leadership”. Managing the different 
generations takes an awareness of what motivates 
them and their world view. Not only must police 
leaders address managing the generation X 
employee, they must also provide a ‘service’ to the 
generation X ‘client’.  
                                                 
                                                26 Gamonal, Paula and Williams, John. (2002). Leading generation x: Getting in touch 
with the energy. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.ravenwerks.com/leadership/genx.htm [2002, November 21] 
27 Smith, Gregory. (2002). Baby boomer versus generation x managing the new 
workforce. [On-line] Available: http://www.businessknowhow.com/manage/genx.htm 
[2002, November 23] at para. 12. 
28 Smith, Gregory. (2002). How to manage generation x employees. [On-line] 
Available: http://www.chartcourse.com/articlegenx.html [2002, November 21] 
 
 
Trust: The Golden Thread 
 
Authors Solomon and Flores29 suggest that true 
leadership requires authentic trust. However, the 
power and hierarchy paradigm that characterize 
traditional workplaces, such as a police 
organization, is the antithesis of trust and simply 
institutionalized distrust. They draw a distinction 
between a power manager, defined by position or 
rank, who manages by the way it has always been, 
and an authentic leader who is able to lead in a 
time of instability and change. The ladder must be 
capable of building trust that goes beyond 
present comforts and security in the workplace, 
to lead in a turbulent, unknown, and adventurous 
future (the type of environment Xers thrives in). 
 
The X generation “disdain…corporate politics and 
bureaucracy and don’t trust any institution”30. 
Micromanaging, which they loathe, suggests they 
cannot be trusted by their managers. In its 2002 
report, “Developing business leaders for 2010”, 
the Conference Board of Canada  notes that 
younger workers “are less trusting of 
organizations, and less willing than past 
generations to subordinate their interests to that 
of the firm”31.  
 
With this innovative and adventurous generation, 
building trust is critical. A leader must make 
every effort to build trust at an individual level. 
 
29 Solomon, Robert C. & Flores, Fernando. (2001). Building trust in business, politics, 
relationships, and life. New York, NY.: Oxford University Press. 
30 Nagle, Terri. (1999). Coaching generation X. [On-line] Available: 
http://www.coachingandmentoring.com/Articles/x’s.html [2002, November 23] at 
para. 6. 
31 Conference Board of Canada. (2002). Developing business leaders for 2010. 
Conference Board Inc. at p.5 
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 Unlike previous generations, today’s leader cannot 
rely on the institution itself providing the 
inherent trust past generations were attracted 
to. Relationship, not regulation, by giving personal 
recognition, one-to-one feedback, and developing 
individual workers, is the cornerstone for 
constructing the trust necessary to successfully 
lead generation X. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The challenge for today’s police leaders is to first 
recognize generational differences. By 
understanding the differences and, by inference, 
the commonalities, leaders will be able to adapt 
enough to address the needs of generation X 
workers while at the same time retain baby 
boomers. Although this may seem a nearly 
impossible task to please everyone, by building 
trust and a leadership style appreciated by all 
generations, it may be attainable. This does not 
suggest that addressing generation X issues is 
the ultimate solution to effectively lead an 
organization. It is a component of providing 
leadership to the kind of employees a leader has, 
not the kind of employees they once had or wish 
they had! 
 
PROACTIVELY PROVIDING 
LEGAL AID VIOLATES RIGHT 
TO CHOOSE LAWYER 
R. v. Feldman, 2003 BCPC 0041 
 
The accused was arrested by a 
i
h
T
b
c
c
A
 
During the voire dire to determine the 
admissibility of his statement, the accused 
argued that the police violated his right to 
counsel of choice protected under s.10(b) of the 
Charter.  He contended that the officer 
prematurely contacted Legal Aid without 
adequately explaining that he had the right to 
choose counsel. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that the accused never asked for a 
specific lawyer or took issue with Legal Aid being 
provided.  
 
British Columbia Provincial Court Justice Auxier 
agreed with the accused. In the Court’s view 
“there was no urgency, danger or other matter 
which prevented those with custody over the 
accused from taking the time to provide him with 
the means of contacting counsel.” Although the 
officer was acting in good faith in trying to assist 
the accused, his right to counsel of choice was 
violated. In excluding the statement because it 
would affect the fairness of the trial, Justice 
Auxier held: 
 
One reason for an accused to speak to the lawyer 
of his choice is because of being comfortable with 
that lawyer. [The accused] may well have followed 
legal advice had he received it from a lawyer he 
knew and trusted….[W]e simply don’t know what 
the accused would have done had his right to 
counsel of his choice not been breached. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
SPECIFIC LAWYER NOT 
REQUESTED: NO s.10(b) 
V
Apolice officer for assault causing 
bodily harm and informed of his 
right to counsel. Although he 
nitially said he did not want to speak to a lawyer, 
e changed his mind at the police detachment. 
he officer did not give the accused a phone 
ook, but instead called Legal Aid and a private 
all lasting 6 minutes ensued. He was lodged in 
ells and later, contrary to the advice of Legal 
id, provided a recorded statement.  
CHARTER BREACH 
R. v. Mirkovic,  
[2003] O.J. No. 367 (OntCJ) 
 
A tow truck operator observed 
e
a
s
olume 3 Issue 3 
pril 2003 the accused driving a damaged 
vehicle on a flat tire at a very 
slow rate of speed on the 
xpress lanes of a highway. The tow operator 
ctivated his flashing lights and the accused 
topped his vehicle. After noting a smell of 
14
 alcohol on the accused’s breath, vomit on his 
clothing, and that he appeared physically ill, the 
tow operator called police.  
 
A police officer attended, observed physical signs 
of impairment, and arrested the accused. At the 
police station the accused stated he wanted to 
talk to a lawyer, but did not request to speak with 
anyone specific. After speaking in private to duty 
counsel for 5 minutes, a matter to which he did 
not object, the accused provided breath samples 
in excess of the legal limit.  
 
During a voire dire the accused alleged, among 
other Charter motions, that he was denied 
counsel of his choice. Justice Ritchie of the 
Ontario Court of Justice accepted the evidence 
of the officer that the accused did not ask to 
speak to a particular lawyer. As such, there was 
no s.10(b) violation and the application was 
dismissed. The accused was convicted. 
 
‘JUDGE SHOPPING’ RENDERS 
WARRANT INVALID 
R. v. Chan & Cheung,  
[2003] O.J. No. 188 (OntSCJ) 
 
Following a winter storm, Ontario 
r
p
t
a
f
i
c
b
t
a
m
 
T
t
s
d
linesmen were trespassing when they made the 
observations. When excising these observations 
from the warrant, there were insufficient 
grounds remaining. A second in-person warrant 
application was successful in front of a different 
Justice of the Peace.  This warrant disclosed the 
initial refusal and also contained a number of 
paragraphs setting out a legal argument in support 
of the application. As a consequence of the 
search, police found almost 3,700 marihuana 
plants and $100,000 in electrical equipment. The 
accused sought to have the evidence excluded 
because the hydro employees made the marihuana 
discovery during a warrantless search and that 
the police were “judge shopping” when they 
applied for and received the second warrant.   
 
Was the Charter Engaged? 
 
The Charter only applies to government agents 
and does not apply to private citizens, unless they 
were acting on behalf of the state or exercising 
statutorily delegated governmental powers. At 
the preliminary hearing, the linesmen testified 
that they entered the shed to look for a 
screwdriver and/or to see if the power was 
flowing even though they did not have the 
authority to do so. Although Justice Hennessy of 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized 
V
AHydro One employees were 
called by the accused Chan to 
repair a transformer that 
esulted in a power failure at a rural resort 
roperty. They found a frozen fuse and one of 
he linesmen went into a nearby open shed to find 
 screwdriver. He did not see any tools, but went 
urther into the building and opened a closed 
nterior door where he found some plants. After 
ompleting repairs the linesman went to a long 
uilding with many wires running into it to see if 
he power was back on. He entered this building 
fter calling “hello” and knocking. Again he found 
ore plants, taking a leaf from the floor.  
his information was provided to the police and a 
elewarrant application was made to search the 
hed and long building for marihuana, but was 
enied by the Justice of the Peace because the 
that Hydro One was created by statute and 
included a right of entry onto land to repair 
transmission and distribution equipment, the 
“linesmen were not acting in furtherance of 
government policy when they entered the sheds, 
since they were neither state agents nor pursuing 
statutorily delegated governmental activity.”  
 
The linesmen were invited onto the property when 
the call was made to investigate the power and 
distribution system and they had the statutory 
authority to repair the transmitter. However, 
they were not invited onto the property to look 
into buildings for tools or to check power flow. 
Nor were they in the shed to gather information 
or evidence for a prosecution. Thus, their conduct 
did not engage Charter scrutiny because when 
they entered the shed “they exceeded any 
olume 3 Issue 3 
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 authority given by statute or by invitation of the 
occupier as a result of the service call”.  
 
Judge Shopping 
 
Both informations to obtain the warrants were 
substantially the same facts. The only 
differences were that the second warrant 
outlined the prior refusal and several paragraphs 
presenting a legal argument why the warrant 
should be issued. Justice Hennessey ruled the 
second warrant invalid because the decision of 
the first Justice of the Peace was final. There 
were no new or additional facts added to the 
warrant, only legal arguments presented to help 
the second Justice of the Peace exercise his 
discretion.  
 
The second Justice of the peace had no 
jurisdiction to review or overrule the judicial 
decision made by a colleague on the same facts. 
He ruled that “the decision of a judicial officer 
from one court is final and binding unless and until 
it has been overturned by a higher court.” As 
Justice Hennessey noted, “What would stop a 
police officer from bringing the same application 
to successive justices, asking each to review the 
decision of the other on the same facts?”.  In the 
Court’s view, if this were allowed the confidence 
enjoyed by the judicial system would be 
undermined.  
 
Admissibility 
 
Since the second warrant was invalid, the search 
carried out by the police was warrantless and a 
violation of the accused’s s.8 Charter right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
However, the evidence was ruled admissible under 
s.24(2). The admission of the real, non-
conscriptive evidence in these serious charges 
found in non-residential property by police acting 
on a facially valid warrant obtained would not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  
The accused’s applications for exclusion were 
dismissed.  
 
QUICK & DRAMATIC POLICE 
ENTRY REASONABLE 
R. v. Dinh, 2002 BCPC 0542 
 
Six police officers executed a 
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search warrant. The police, 
seeing the accused inside the 
ouse, loudly knocked several times on the front 
oor while yelling, “police, search warrant”. 
owever, they received no response. As a result, 
 battering ram was used and police forced entry 
nto the home with their firearms drawn. The 
olice cleared the house and found the accused 
nd her infant child in a bedroom near the front 
oor. The hydro by-pass was located in a wall in 
he kitchen after a small hole was made in the 
yproc. Also found in the house was a large 
arihuana grow operation, which was subsequently 
eized under a second search warrant. The 
ccused was arrested, advised of her Charter 
ights, and allowed to call and make arrangements 
or the care of her child. Following transport to 
he police station, she was provided access to 
ounsel.  
uring the voire dire, the accused challenged the 
dmissibility of the evidence by alleging that her 
harter rights were violated because the police 
iolently entered her home and damaged it during 
he search. She also submitted that her arrest 
as not lawful because of the manner of police 
ntry and that she was denied the right to 
ounsel until she was at the police station. 
ntry 
ritish Columbia Provincial Court Justice Gove 
ound the entry reasonable in all of the 
ircumstances. The police testified that they 
xpected to find a marihuana grow operation once 
hey entered. Furthermore, even though there 
as no danger expected, the use of the battering 
am was common practice when there was no 
esponse to knocking. The officers also testified 
bout safety concerns when entering a home 
16
 containing a marihuana grow operation. The police 
do not want to stand on the door stoop for more 
than a few seconds because they fear the use of 
weapons or booby traps to protect the crops from 
theft. As well, trying door knobs may result in 
electrocution. Justice Gove found that “any 
damage done was directly related to the entry, 
finding the hydro by-pass, and removing the 
marihuana grow operation.”  
 
Arrest 
 
The arrest was also lawful. Justice Gove stated: 
 
I am also not satisfied that the manner in which 
the house was entered, although it may have 
caused some fear in the mind of the accused, in 
anyway affected the lawfulness of the search and 
her arrest. The police officers were very candid 
that they intended to have a dramatic entry in 
order to catch those inside off guard. Once there 
was not a response to the knock on the door and 
the yelling "police, search warrant" the officers 
believed, and I think reasonably so, that their 
safety and the safety of the occupants would be 
best insured by a quick and somewhat dramatic 
entry. 
 
Counsel 
 
Justice Gove did however, find that the police 
breached the accused’s s.10(b) Charter right to 
counsel when they did not provide her with the 
opportunity to contact counsel at her home 
stating:  
 
The police violated the accused's s.10(b) rights 
when [the officer] failed to allow her an 
opportunity to telephone counsel shortly after her 
arrest. Once the police "cleared the house" and 
had the situation under control, there was no 
reason that she should not have been allowed to 
use the telephone while still at her home. There 
were no issues of urgency that would have 
precluded her from making such a telephone call, 
and although she may not have been able to make a 
telephone call in private, that is not an issue in 
which I can rule, as she was not afforded an 
opportunity to at least attempt a telephone call. 
She may have waived any right to privacy, under all 
the circumstances … I am satisfied there was a 
breach of s.10(b) rights. [references omitted] 
 
Admissibility 
 
Despite the s.10(b) violation, the evidence was 
ruled admissible for trial. There was no nexus 
between the breach and the discovery of the 
marihuana and the violation was not serious; it 
lasted only a matter of minutes until she 
contacted counsel at the detachment.   
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE NOT 
NECESSARY FOR SOBRIETY 
VEHICLE STOP 
R. v. Sothmann, 2002 SKQB 682 
 
A uniformed police officer was 
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a possible impaired driver and 
stopped him after he was caught 
n radar driving approximately 20 km/h below the 
00 km/h speed limit. As a result of the stop, the 
ccused submitted to a roadside screening 
emand and failed. He was advised of his right to 
ounsel and taken to the police station for a 
reathalyser test. Once there, he was asked if he 
ished to contact counsel, but declined. He then 
rovided breath samples in excess of the legal 
imit and was subsequently convicted in 
askatchewan Provincial Court of driving while 
ver of 80mg%.  The accused appealed to the 
askatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing, in 
art, that he was arbitrarily detained contrary to 
.9 of the Charter because the officer did not 
ave an articulable cause to stop him. 
ueen’s Bench Justice Laing dismissed the appeal. 
n his view, “articulable cause only applies when 
he motorist is being stopped for a non-highway-
raffic…reason.” In this case, the officer stopped 
he accused for a lawful highway traffic reason 
sobriety). Justice Laing stated: 
17
 If a uniformed patrol officer whose duties include 
traffic patrol can randomly stop (meaning for no 
reason at all) a motor vehicle to check its licence, 
its mechanical condition, or the sobriety of the 
driver, then it follows that if something about the 
driving of the vehicle causes the officer to 
randomly stop it, that something can be anything, 
including intuition, as long as the purpose is to 
check the licence, the sobriety of the driver or 
any other highway traffic reason. It is not 
necessary that the motorist first commit a driving 
infraction or irregularity before the stop is lawful. 
As the cases referred to above note, the random 
stopping of vehicles is directed at the prevention 
and deterrent aspects of highway traffic law 
enforcement. 
  
Complete case available at www.conlii.org 
 
FAILURE TO ENQUIRE ABOUT 
DESIRE TO CALL LAWYER NOT 
FATAL 
R. v. Keel & York, 2003 BCPC 0077 
 
A rural officer on patrol in the 
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box, and advised him he was being detained for 
investigative purposes related to possession of a 
controlled substance.  
 
Because the stop was in an isolated and remote 
area the officer was unable to make contact with 
his dispatcher. As directed, the accused followed 
him in their pick-up to a location where the radio 
would work.  The officer called for back-up and 
read Keel a Charter warning from a card. 
Although he asked Keel if he understood the 
warning, the officer did not ask him if wished to 
call a lawyer since he did not have a telephone 
readily available. He then proceeded to question 
him about the contents of the box in the back of 
the pickup.  
 
Keel admitted to possessing the marihuana plants 
and that he was going to plant them in the forest. 
The officer then provided a Charter warning to 
the passenger York who stated Keel owned the 
plants and that they were going into the bush 
with them. Other officers arrived on scene and 
the two accused were taken back to the 
detachment and the marihuana was seized. The 
V
Amid-afternoon observed a pick-
up truck being driven by two 
males without shoulder harness 
eatbelts. He also noted ropes in the back of the 
ick-up used for slinging shakes. This was unusual 
n the officer’s view because shake block cutters 
raveled the accused’s direction in the morning, 
ot mid-afternoon. The officer stopped the pick-
p to check the seatbelts and the sling ropes. The 
ccupants exited the vehicle and the officer 
sked for and was provided a driver’s licence.  
he officer told the driver Keel why he was 
topped and began to question him about the 
ontents in the rear of the pick-up; sling ropes, 
ags of dirt, manure, shovels, several buckets, 
nd a tarp. The truck was an older model and was 
ot equipped with shoulder belts; it had only lap 
elts. The officer asked what was under the tarp 
nd was told boxes with dirt. After the officer 
sked to see the dirt, the accused Keel opened 
he corner on one of the boxes. The officer 
bserved marihuana, told the accused to close the 
accused argued that his right to counsel under s. 
10 and his right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure under s.8 of the Charter were 
breached.  
 
Right to Counsel 
 
The accused submitted that the s.10 violation 
stemmed from the fact that the officer failed to 
ask, “Did you want to contact a lawyer?” In their 
view, the police are obliged to ask this question. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that 
once the police have advised an accused of their 
right to counsel there are no additional duties 
triggered unless they express a desire to 
exercise the right. The Crown further contended 
that the accused must establish that they were 
denied an opportunity to contact counsel. In 
reluctantly agreeing with the Crown, British 
Columbia Provincial Court Justice Doherty stated: 
 
The police have developed a protocol that requires 
them to ask a detained or arrested person whether 
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 they want to contact counsel after they have 
ensured the person understands their rights. It 
would be a retrograde step in the development of 
civil liberties in this country should police abandon 
what has become, for all intents and purposes, 
what they perceive to be their duty to ask this 
crucial question, "Do you want to contact a 
lawyer?" 
 
Still, the law would seem to be that the inquiry is 
not mandatory and that all that is required is for 
police to inform the person of their rights. The 
onus would seem to be on the accused to assert 
that right to consult counsel, and the onus is on 
the accused who asserts he was deprived of an 
opportunity to do so. 
 
In the case at bar, considering the remote location 
at which the police and the defendants found 
themselves, there was no realistic opportunity for 
the defendants to contact counsel, even if the 
question "Do you want to contact counsel?" had 
been asked. The troublesome aspect of this case is 
that the police officer has given evidence that he 
would have stopped asking questions of the 
defendants had this question been asked and been 
responded to in the affirmative. By not asking the 
question in the first place he avoided having to halt 
his questioning. 
 
The Search 
 
Justice Doherty also concluded that there was no 
s.8 breach because the officer had, at minimum, 
an articulable cause to justify the search. The 
Court held: 
 
There is little doubt that the police officer had 
good reason to stop the pickup truck to investigate 
a possible seatbelt infraction, and I have no 
difficulty in ruling that the stop was legal. Once 
the vehicle was stopped, the police officer's 
suspicion that the defendants might be going into 
the forest to plant marihuana was supported by 
certain of his observations regarding the bags of 
dirt, manure, and shovel. 
 
[The officer] asked Mr. Keel if he could examine 
the content of the boxes or be shown the contents 
in the back of the pickup. Mr. Keel was under no 
obligation or compulsion to open the box for the 
constable to view. I agree with the submissions of 
the Crown that even if it were determined that 
the officer did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to search, he had, at the very least, 
articulable cause. 
  
In the end, no Charter breaches were found and 
the evidence was admissible on charges of 
unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
 “IN SERVICE: 10-8”  
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter would like to 
share some of our 
readers’ comments about 
the publication. We 
appreciate the kind words 
we have received thus far and look forward to 
future editions: 
*************** 
“I was forwarded a copy of your newsletter by a 
co-worker and must say I was impressed with the 
way it was delivered. I especially like the fact 
that the issues revolve around street level 
activity, things I deal with daily. I found both 
issues I read to be more than useful and have 
referred to them twice”. Police Constable, RCMP 
New Brunswick 
*************** 
“…I happened to come across your In Service: 10-
8 newsletter.  I just wanted to let you know that 
you put together a great collection of relevant 
operational case laws.  I share your newsletter 
with my recruit and other members who care 
about their work”. Police Constable, RCMP 
British Columbia 
*************** 
“Your analysis of recent cases was pointed out to 
me as a great way to keep up on case law - great 
job”.  Police Inspector, British Columbia 
*************** 
“Really enjoy the newsletter! Would like to get on 
the mailing list…”. Police Constable, RCMP British 
Columbia 
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 “I (and our team) find the newsletter very 
informative and [it] is often referred to during 
discussions/debates with some of our more junior 
members”. Police Constable, RCMP British 
Columbia 
*************** 
“I have read the newsletters from the first issue 
through and I thoroughly enjoy it and find it a 
valuable source for information”. Police 
Constable, RCMP British Columbia 
*************** 
“I hope that…10-8 will continue as I find it very 
informative and useful. Keep up the good work”. 
Investigator, Canada Customs and Revenue 
Agency 
*************** 
“Everybody on my shift looks forward to reading 
it. Great job!” Police Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“I have read it and found it to be most 
informative.” Police Corporal, RCMP British 
Columbia 
*************** 
“[J]ust wanted to tell you that after 1 1/2 years 
your paper has just got better and better. I use 
your paper regularly to identify current case law 
and to keep my own members informed of judicial 
changes in the way we do our business. Keep up 
the good work!!” Police Sergeant, Manitoba 
 
*************** 
“Thanks for the In-Service 10-8 Newsletter. It is 
greatly appreciated by the office”. Crown 
Prosecutor, British Columbia  
*************** 
“It's after midnight and I am reading your 
newsletter and enjoying it! I just wanted to drop 
you a line and thank you for putting it out, it's 
great to have a place to keep up with the recent 
decisions…” Police Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“Thank you very much for the newsletters. They 
are very informative and useful.” Supreme Court 
Justice, British Columbia 
*************** 
“I have just received the latest edition of the … 
newsletter. I just wanted you to know how much 
the newsletter is appreciated by myself and 
others around our office. I always ensure that all 
members of my unit get a copy and I keep mine 
handy. Just this morning as I was distributing it, 
the members comments were "Thanks, these are 
great", as I put it in their 'In Basket'. I am 
frequently referring to the past editions 
regarding issues that arise, and am very happy to 
have the reference material.” Police Constable, 
British Columbia 
*************** 
“I was given a copy of your newsletter and 
thoroughly enjoyed reading it.” Police Constable, 
Saskatchewan 
*************** 
“I find the newsletters very informative, and 
extremely helpful. Keep up the good work.” Police 
Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“I just recently discovered your newsletter on 
the web and have found it to be a most useful 
source of information!!… Great work on the 
newsletter....I'm really happy that I discovered it 
when I did!!” Citizen, British Columbia 
 
JIBC OFFERS CERTIFICATE IN 
FORENSIC TRAFFIC SCIENCES 
 
The Justice Institute of 
British Columbia (JIBC), in 
partnership with the 
Insurance Corporation of 
British Columbia, is pleased to 
offer a Certificate in Forensic 
Traffic Sciences. This Certificate prepares 
graduates to enter the field with a sound 
educational base and a solid practical foundation, 
to advance within their current careers, or to 
change careers. This Certificate is only available 
at the Police Academy. The 30 credit program is 
the “first year” of an applied program of study. 
Future plans include a Diploma in Forensic Traffic 
Sciences, which will advance the skills and 
knowledge of students to “second year” level with 
the completion of the necessary credits. The 
Applied Degree approach to post secondary 
education is broad and practical-
delivering integrated technical skills 
with substantial applied content and 
the completion of 120 hours. An 
applied degree offers: 
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 • valuable applied experience before 
graduation; 
• the skill and knowledge employers want in 
Canada and around the world; and 
• more opportunities for rapid career 
advancement.  
 
What is forensic Traffic Sciences? 
 
Forensic Traffic Sciences is the study of traffic 
unit collisions involving the investigation, analysis, 
and reconstruction of the incident. The JIBC 
Certificate in Forensic Traffic Sciences now 
offers working professionals a unique opportunity 
to learn theory and apply learning while acquiring 
significant academic recognition. Working 
practitioners in the program include law 
enforcement personnel as well as other 
professionals engaged in public safety: 
 
• insurance investigators; 
• motor vehicle and transit fleet supervisors; 
• railway police agencies; 
• workers compensation professionals; 
• military investigators; 
• legal and medical practitioners; and 
• highway safety engineers. 
 
The opportunities for work include: 
 
• investigating the scene of a traffic unit(s) 
collision; 
• managing an incident when first on scene; 
• identifying, collecting, recording, and 
interpreting evidence; and 
• planning and conducting interviews and 
analyzing statements. 
 
This program prepares students to continue their 
study to a diploma or degree level. 
 
How is the Certificate Program 
Delivered? 
 
Six core courses (24 credits) are offered in 
concentrated, one-week modules, with pre-
readings and post-course assignments at the 
JIBC. In addition, two liberal arts courses (6 
credits) are required to complete the 30 credit 
certificate. 
 
Core Courses (24 credits) 
 
On-scene Collision Investigation (POLFTS100 
-3 credits) Learning how to manage a collision 
scene is the primary intent of this course. 
Students learn the principles and practices of 
selecting and using appropriate tools and 
measurements, identifying, photographing, and 
interpreting physical evidence at the scene. 
 
Interview Techniques and Statement 
Analysis (POLFTS110-3 credits) Explores the 
human elements of a collision. Through interviews 
and statement analysis students will learn how to 
retrieve vital information to enhance the 
interview process, demonstrate mastery in verbal 
and non-verbal interrogation, and analysis 
techniques. 
 
Hit and Run Investigations (POLFTS120-3 
credits) Conducting a comprehensive hit and run 
investigation is the focal point of learning in this 
course. Students learn to develop search 
patterns, coordinate investigation teams, and 
apply the principles of damage profiles and 
collision dynamics. 
 
Forensic Photography Techniques (POLFTS 
130-3 credits) Applying forensic photographic 
skills to the investigation of traffic unit(s) 
collision is the focus of this challenging module. 
Students will learn how to use SLR, digital, and 
video cameras, and apply the theory of forensic 
photography in order to secure evidential 
photographs under varied conditions.  
 
Impaired Driving Detection (POLFTS140-3 
credits) Focuses on the scientific basis of 
sobriety testing approved and recommended by 
the IACP, developed by the Federal U.S. 
Department of Transportation and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Includes 
legal study, evidence gathering, and decision 
making. Topics include principles of psycho-
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 physical testing and an introduction (8 hrs) to 
drugs that impair.  
 
Commercial Vehicle Assessment and 
Enforcement (POLFTS150-3 credits) Provides 
students with knowledge to recognize unsafe 
commercial transport units and to take action. 
Students explore topics including driver fitness 
and qualifications, vehicle inspection, and 
essential investigative criteria. 
 
Basic Collision Analysis (POLFTS200-6 
credits) Prerequisite POLFTS100. Conducting in-
depth technical collision investigations through 
on-site analytical skills, students learn to collect 
evidence, identify vehicular restraint systems, 
conduct damage analysis, and manage and 
interpret the collection of pertinent data.  
 
Liberal Arts Courses (6 credits) 
 
Foundation of Communication and Conflict 
Resolution (3 credits) Offered by the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution at the JIBC. This course will 
be scheduled especially for students who will be 
notified of dates and times. Additionally, an 
English 100 course (first year College/University) 
is necessary. This course may be taken at any 
recognized educational institution and the credits 
transferred to the certificate program.  
 
Transfer Credits and PLAR 
 
Students may apply to have courses from other 
institutions -- including police colleges, military 
colleges, or in-house training -- applied to this 
program. Students who have worked in the field 
and have met the learning objectives of core 
courses may apply to have their learning 
recognized through the Prior Learning 
Assessment Recognition (PLAR) process.  
 
Course Fees 
 
Course fees vary depending on the cost of the 
individual course materials, facilities, and 
equipment. Check the course description for 
details.  
Admission Requirements 
 
Completion of Mathematics Grade 12 and Physics 
Grade 11 is recommended for some courses, but 
not required. Students do not need to be enrolled 
in the Certificate Program in order to take 
courses. Once students have completed 15 credits 
however, they are encouraged to apply. 
 
Applications are available through the Program 
Coordinator and mature students who have not 
completed Grade 12 may be admitted to the 
program under some circumstances. 
 
For information on this program call 604-528-
5753 or visit our web page at www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
TAX LAW & LAW ENFORCEMENT: 
WORKING WITH THE CCRA 
Dave Quail32 
 
Investigations are one of 
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A
amany enforcement activities 
used by the Canada Customs 
& Revenue Agency (CCRA) to 
preserve public trust in the 
fairness and integrity of the 
self-assessment system by 
nsuring that the provisions of the legislation 
dministered by the CCRA are honoured by all 
axpayers, registrants, importers and exporters, 
nd that they pay their fair share of taxes and 
uties and receive their proper entitlements. The 
ncome Tax Act, Excise Tax Act, Customs Act 
nd the other acts administered are regulatory 
tatutes that provide for criminal sanctions.  
s with all regimes in the developed world, 
riminal sanctions are provided to ensure 
ompliance by deterring fraudulent behavior.  The 
verall mandate of the Investigations Program is 
o enhance compliance levels with the various acts 
dministered through effective enforcement and, 
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2 Dave Quail is with the Investigations Division of Canada Customs and Revenue 
gency and can be contacted at 250-363-8736 or by e-mail at Dave.Quail@ccra-
drc.gc.ca 
 thereby, contribute to the public trust, fairness, 
and integrity of the self-assessment system.  
 
The Investigations Division operates 3 main 
programs for the CCRA: 
 
• the Leads and Assistance Program (LAP); 
• the Special Enforcement Program (SEP); 
and 
• the Criminal Investigations Program (CIP). 
 
This article will focus on LAP & SEP, as they are 
more relevant to police organizations. As well, the 
mandate of CIP is also discussed.   
 
Leads and Assistance Program (LAP) 
 
Mandate 
 
The LAP mandate is to coordinate the informant 
leads received and to provide assistance, upon 
request, to other programs, domestic and foreign 
tax and customs authorities, and other 
enforcement agencies. 
 
Program Objectives 
  
Subsection 241(1) of the ITA and 295(2) of the 
ETA prohibit an official, including officers of the 
CCRA, from communicating any information to or 
allowing access to any books and records obtained 
under these acts to any person. Subsection 241(2) 
of the ITA and 295(3) of the ETA prohibit an 
official from giving evidence or producing any 
books or records obtained under these acts, in 
any legal proceedings. All taxpayer information is 
also protected from 3rd parties.  The LAP program objectives are summarized as 
follows:  
 
• To control and screen leads received from 
informants relating to alleged non-compliance 
under the revenue acts administered, refer 
these leads to the appropriate area for 
action, and report on their disposition.  These 
leads are reviewed, databases are searched 
for information, and a decision based on 
potential tax at risk is made to determine the 
appropriate action. Leads are recorded in a 
database and those leads are forwarded to 
other areas for action and are followed up for 
results. These activities are handled by 
Investigations because of their expertise in 
investigative matters and the need to protect 
the information and the identity of 
informants;  
 
• To control and process, on a priority basis, 
international requests for assistance in 
gathering evidence for criminal investigations, 
including grand jury and multi-agency 
investigations; and 
 
• To assist other functions and departments as 
required with administrative prosecutions and 
requirements for information. The assistance 
provided includes advice and guidance to 
Audit, Collections and International Tax, 
handling Criminal Code access orders, and 
processing requests for information from 
other government departments including 
Human Resource Development.  
 
Confidentiality of Income Tax (ITA) & 
Excise Tax (ETA) Information 
 
 
However s.241(3) ITA and s.295(4) ETA allows 
for information to be released to Law 
Enforcement Agencies under specific 
circumstances.  Subsection 241(3) ITA and 
s.295(4) ETA provide an exception to s.241(1) & 
(2) ITA and s.295(2) & (3) ETA, with respect to 
the production of information in the possession of 
the CCRA.  When criminal proceedings related to 
the administration or enforcement of the acts 
administered by the CCRA have commenced by 
charge, CCRA policy regarding the production of 
information in their possession to the police is as 
follows: 
 
• The police or Crown counsel must provide a 
copy of the charges and a letter advising that 
charges have been laid. As well, the letter 
must set out what information is requested 
and assurances that the information 
requested is relevant to the charges laid.  
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 Information will not be passed where certain 
named charges have been laid and the letter 
indicates or it is believed that the 
information requested is in respect of a 
different investigation for which charges 
have not yet been laid.  
 
• Once it is determined that the requested 
information may be provided, it is not 
required that CCRA have a subpoena in hand 
before providing the information to the police 
or Crown counsel. This will allow the 
requesting agency prepare for trial.  However, 
a subpoena must be received prior to 
producing the information in court. 
 
This policy is also applicable to s.107 and 108 of 
the Customs Act.  
 
Special Enforcement Program (SEP) 
 
Mandate 
 
The SEP mandate is to combat, with the 
assistance and support of the Office of the 
Solicitor General represented by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other 
external partners, organized crime through the 
enforcement of the various acts that the CCRA 
administers. In 1972, the Government of Canada 
directed that the Department of National 
Revenue and Taxation, with the assistance and 
support of the RCMP, conduct a continuing 
program of tax audits and investigations into the 
affairs of members of organized crime.  
  
These individuals are usually charged by police 
agencies for other major offences such as drug 
trafficking. The fact that they are also 
prosecuted for tax charges does not usually 
result in greater sentences/fines. In many 
instances, the prison term received on the tax 
charges is served concurrently with the jail 
sentence related to the other charges. In view of 
this, Investigations adopted a policy that no 
criminal investigation will normally be conducted in 
cases where an individual has been or will be 
charged by a police agency for a criminal offence 
and has received or is likely to receive a term of 
imprisonment of two years or more. Exceptions to 
this policy would be when the police request that 
we proceed with tax charges to increase the 
chances of convicting a high-profile member of 
organized crime.  
 
Originally, the program only enforced the ITA in 
its attack on crime. However, with the 
consolidation of Tax, GST and Customs, SEP is 
now also enforcing the other acts where 
appropriate.  
 
Program Objectives 
 
The overall objectives of SEP are to:  
 
• Minimize the accumulation 
of unreported illicit wealth 
amassed by persons 
engaged in illegal 
activities, thereby causing 
disruption to organized cr
infiltration of legitimate bus
elements, and reduce the
organized crime on society.  
 
• Forge strategic alliances a
with law enforcement agenci
to improve CCRA efficiency 
impact of CCRA actions on or
activities including areas 
taxation, such as proceeds o
proposed money laundering leg
 
The main motivation of criminal
the attainment of profits. Gover
countries have realized that to c
crime, ways have to be found
wealth generated by their 
enforcement of the laws admi
CCRA is one effective way to cont
 
Illegal activities of organized c
viewed as pertaining to violent p
such as drug trafficking, 
prostitution. However organized
extensively involved in other typ
crime such as stock fraud, in
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 international telemarketing fraud, money 
laundering, corruption of public officials, and tax, 
GST, and Customs fraud. The Program targets all 
those illegal activities that generate profits. 
 
It may be viewed that the attack on organized 
crime and its wealth is a policing issue and that 
the proceeds of crime legislation enacted by 
government gives police the necessary tools to 
attack criminally obtained wealth. However, the 
proceed of crime laws should not be construed as 
a replacement for the SEP program. There are 
several distinct advantages enjoyed by SEP. For 
example, it is not necessary to separate 
legitimate from illegitimate income.  
 
The burden of proof is less stringent within the 
context of a revenue civil re-assessment than 
with criminal proceedings under the proceeds of 
crime legislation. Also, in order for proceeds of 
crime forfeitures to take place, there must be a 
conviction of a substantive offence. Frequently, 
this is not possible and provisions of the ITA and 
ETA become more effective and often the only 
means of minimizing the accumulation of illicit 
wealth. SEP continues to play an important role in 
government actions against persons involved in 
organized criminal activities. 
 
The above objectives are accomplished through 
the following activities:  
 
¾ Identifying potential targets and obtaining 
information on the scope of their illegal 
activities. Since the CCRA has no intelligence 
per say on criminal organizations and its 
members, it relies on police agencies to 
provide targets, their involvement in crime, 
and financial data such as assets and lifestyle. 
The CCRA generally accepts the police 
evaluation of a problem in the criminal 
economy from their perspective and work with 
them to enforce revenue laws. Therefore, if 
police are placing emphasis on motorcycle 
gangs or the Italian Mafia, these will 
invariably be the principal targets referred to 
the program.  
 
At the inception of the program in 1972, all 
referrals came from the RCMP. Since then, 
through marketing efforts, other 
enforcement agencies have become aware of 
the Program. The RCMP accounts for 45% of 
the referrals to SEP; 55% comes from other 
agencies such as the provincial police, local 
police, insurance investigators and stock 
exchange security, to mention a few.  
 
¾ Pursuing strategic alliances with law 
enforcement agencies where the goal is to 
remove the accumulation of unreported illicit 
wealth. Investigations have seconded 
investigators to the RCMP Integrated 
Proceeds of Crime units (IPOC) across 
Canada.  
 
The main roles of Revenue Canada personnel 
on the IPOC units are liaison between the two 
organizations and the identification of cases 
offering tax re-assessment potential for 
timely referral to the SEP units in CCRA’s Tax 
Services Offices. Another key role is to 
provide forensic accounting expertise to the 
other members of the IPOC units. Both 
groups operate effectively while ensuring that 
the confidentiality provisions of the acts 
administered are observed.  
 
¾ Working with the Anti-evasion Division and 
other departments in developing a proposal 
for the establishment of a Mandatory 
Suspicious Transaction Reporting system to 
identify and deter money-laundering 
practices. 
 
¾ Requesting from individuals and corporations 
tax returns and/or statements of assets and 
liabilities. Persons involved in illegal activities 
have normally no desire to participate in a 
legal system. In an attempt to hide profits 
earned and their assets, they normally do not 
file tax returns or keep books and records. 
Therefore, one of the first enforcement 
actions initiated is to require them to file tax 
returns. In situations where there is 
insufficient financial data regarding an 
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 individual’s assets and lifestyle, the CCRA 
requires them to produce statements setting 
out their assets, liabilities, and personal 
expenses. These are used to establish the 
potential for further compliance or 
enforcement action. Should the persons fail 
to file the returns and/or the statements, 
they may be prosecuted. Fines range from 
$1,000 to $25,000 and may include a jail term 
not exceeding 12 months in addition to being 
ordered by a court to file these returns 
and/or statements.  
 
¾ Conducting audits on files showing good 
potential for tax recoveries. Since most 
individuals do not keep records of their illegal 
activities, the audits are usually conducted by 
indirect methods, principally the net worth 
method. Re-assessments issued include taxes, 
interest, and civil penalties.  
 
¾ Conducting investigations of significant cases 
where there are indications of tax fraud. 
Where cases of suspected tax fraud are 
uncovered, the file is referred to the Criminal 
Investigations Program (CIP) where 
investigations are performed and referrals 
are made to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution. Jail sentences are often sought 
in addition to monetary fines.  
 
Criminal Investigations Program (CIP) 
 
The CIP mandate is to conduct criminal 
investigations into suspected cases of evasion or 
fraud with respect to the various acts 
administered and to prosecute and publicize each 
case where sufficient evidence is obtained to 
support conviction for deliberate or wilful evasion 
with respect to these acts. The major acts 
administered include the Income Tax Act, the 
Excise Tax Act, the Excise Act, the Customs Act, 
the Customs Tariff Act, and the Export and 
Import Permits Act.  
 
Editor’s Comments: “In Service: 10-8” would like 
to thank Canada Customs and Revenue Agency 
Investigator Dan Quail for this submission. 
OUT OF PROVINCE 
INTERCEPTION VALID 
WITHOUT HOME COURT 
BACKING 
R. v. Chang & Kullman,  
(2003) Docket:C31682-C31401 (OntCA) 
 
The police in Quebec were 
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municipal construction contracts 
involving a city official and 
subsequently obtained a wiretap authorization 
from the Superior Court of Quebec to intercept 
the telephone conversations of the city official 
and another involved person. As a result of these 
wiretaps, the police were then led to further 
investigate an alleged sale of false visas for entry 
into Canada. Two Ontario residents were 
identified as also being involved in the discussions 
over the fraudulent visas. Quebec police applied 
for and received two further wiretap 
authorizations; one to renew the authorization 
relating to the bid-rigging and the second in 
relation to the immigration investigation. The 
Ontario RCMP assisted and they obtained the 
cooperation of the telephone company in Ontario 
in setting up the wiretaps on the targets. These 
wiretaps under the Quebec authorization resulted 
in information pertaining to various illegal 
immigration schemes.  
 
The Ontario RCMP subsequently applied for and 
received their own authorization in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice to intercept 
communications largely on information obtained 
from the Quebec immigration investigation 
wiretap. This Ontario wiretap authorization 
included, for the first time, discussions involving 
the accused Chang. Ontario RCMP received a 
further authorization naming many of the same 
targets but added five others, including Chang. 
Under this new authorization, telephone calls 
made by the accused Kullman were also 
intercepted. 
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 Although objected to at trial, the intercepted 
telephone calls were admitted into evidence and 
the accused Chang was charged with conspiracy to 
assist a named person into Canada illegally while 
both Chang and Kullman were charged with 
conspiracy to assist unnamed persons to enter 
Canada illegally. Evidence at trial determined that 
Chang, an immigration officer, was going to allow a 
young woman (destined to be a prostitute) to 
arrive on a flight from Thailand to Toronto and 
pass through his inspection without enquiries.  For 
his involvement, Chang would receive a $1000 
bribe.  Kullman, also an Immigration officer, was 
also overheard to be involved in the sale of blank 
visitor visas. The two accused, sitting without a 
jury, were convicted partially on the intercepted 
conversations, but appealed to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. They argued, among other reasons, 
that the Quebec authorizations were unlawful and 
therefore the Ontario police could not use them 
to support their authorization. Furthermore, they 
contended that the police failed to comply with 
s.188.1(2) of the Criminal Code and did not have 
the Quebec authorizations backed by an Ontario 
Court.  
 
Using the Quebec Authorizations 
 
The accused submitted that the Ontario police 
used information obtained from the Quebec 
authorizations, which in their view were not lawful 
because the police failed to establish 
investigative necessity as required under 
s.186(1)(b) of the Code. However, the trial judge 
limited her review only to the facial validity of 
the authorizations and did not review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
wiretap. In other words, she found that the 
Quebec superior judge who made the order had 
the jurisdiction to do so and there was no need to 
go any further and review whether investigative 
necessity had been established. It was this 
failure to go beneath the face of the warrant 
itself and examine the evidence that the accused 
argued was an error. However, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal disagreed. The Court held: 
 
In our view, the trial judge quite properly 
concluded that once an Ontario judge is satisfied 
that the Quebec judge had jurisdiction to make 
the order, and that the steps that were taken to 
execute it were lawful, then that is the end of the 
Ontario court's inquiry.  
 
And further: 
 
We are also of the view that for an Ontario 
superior court judge in these circumstances to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 
the authorization of another province's superior 
court would offend the general rule that a court 
order is immune from collateral attack. 
 
Extra-provincial execution of wiretaps 
 
Section 188.1(2) of the Code states that an 
authorization given in one province may be 
confirmed by a judge in another province and then 
shall be of full force. The trial judge found the 
language used in this section (“may”) was 
permissive, but not mandatory. Thus a 
confirmation order in a different province is not 
compulsory. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed 
and held that “if Parliament had intended to 
require a confirmation order in every situation of 
extra-provincial execution of wiretap 
authorizations, it could have done so in simple and 
straightforward language.” Thus, this ground of 
appeal was rejected.   
 
The appeals were dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Traffic Quotes 
 
“No Sir, I got my quota yesterday. These tickets 
are just for fun.” 
 
“Yes, I can give you a warning. Speed again and I’ll 
write you another ticket.” 
 
“You already got a break. It’s the pedal next to 
the accelerator.” 
 
“The answer to the next question will determine if 
you are drunk. Was Mickey Mouse a cat or a dog.” 
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 ONLY FACTORS USED BY 
OFFICER MAY BE CONSIDERED 
IN ASSESSING ARTICULABLE 
CAUSE 
R. v. Coles, 2003 PESCAD 3 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused with the intent to issue 
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At the same time, the Supreme Court judge was 
of the opinion that under the common law the 
police may stop persons where they have an 
articulable cause. In allowing the appeal and 
ordering a new trial, the judge stated: 
 
There were three specific, objective, discernable 
facts, namely the slow driving, the early signalling, 
and the alleged failure to yield that caused the 
V
Aa warning after he had followed 
him drive at a speed well below 
the speed limit, signal well in 
dvance of his turn, and proceed through a 
rosswalk just as a pedestrian entered it. As a 
esult of interacting with the driver, the officer 
ormed the opinion he had sufficient grounds to 
ake a demand for breath samples. Subsequent 
amples provided were in excess of the 80mg% 
imit. At his trial on impaired driving charges, the 
udge found the accused’s detention arbitrary and 
hus contrary to s.9 of the Charter because he 
as stopped without authorization or reasonable 
ause. As a consequence, the evidence of 
mpairment and certificates of analysis were 
xcluded as evidence and the accused was 
cquitted.  
he Crown appealed to the Prince Edward Island 
upreme Court33, which overturned the conviction 
nd ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court judge 
ound the detention lawful and not arbitrary. He 
oncluded that the authority to stop the vehicle 
ould arise from either statute or articulable 
ause at common law. In this case, the officer had 
 reasonable belief the vehicle was being 
perated contrary to Prince Edward Island’s 
ighway Traffic Act (HTA). The officer had an 
onestly held belief that the accused failed to 
ield to a pedestrian under s.190(1) HTA. 
urthermore, s.10(1)(c) of the Act permits a 
olice officer to direct traffic to ensure safety 
n the highway. This would allow the officer to 
top the accused believing his actions were a 
ublic safety hazard. Stopping him was therefore 
ot arbitrary, random, or without foundation.  
                                                
3 see R. v. Coles, 2003 PEISCTD 36 
police officer to select the [accused’s] vehicle. It 
was not a hunch. It was not a random stop. There 
was a rational foundation for the detention. It was 
not a[n] arbitrary detention… 
 
And further: 
 
I am of the opinion that the three specific and 
articulable observations, when taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, would 
constitute objectively discernible facts and 
provide reasonable grounds to suspect the driver 
to be impaired. The fact that, subjectively, the 
officer did not connect the three observations and 
suspect impairment does not preclude finding, on 
an objective analysis, that there were grounds to 
suspect impairment, and therefore, grounds to stop 
the [accused]. 
 
Dissatisfied with the result, the accused appealed 
to the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court 
Appeal Division (PEISCAD) seeking a reversal of 
the Supreme Court’s judgment. He submitted that 
the officer in this case acted arbitrarily because 
he neither had lawful authority (statutory or 
common law) to stop the vehicle nor an articulable 
cause. The PEISCAD agreed and ruled in favour 
of the accused.  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
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Chief Justice Mitchell, writing the opinion for the 
2:1 majority, noted that a detention will not be 
arbitrary under s.9 of the Charter when a police 
officer “acts in accordance with statutory or 
common law authority and has articulable cause.” 
In this case, the officer stopped the accused 
because he believed s.190(1) HTA had been 
violated when a pedestrian had just stepped into a 
crosswalk, but was not yet into or near the 
 accused’s side of the roadway. However, s.190(1) 
does not cover such a situation. A breach of 
s.190(1) requires the pedestrian to be on or so 
near the motorists half of the roadway as to 
constitute a danger. Furthermore, s.10(1)(c) and 
(d) of the Act were not applicable. None of the 
specific purposes enunciated in s.10(1)(c) 
(directing traffic in an emergency/ expediting 
traffic/ ensuring highway safety) were present. 
Nor did the officer have a reasonable belief that 
the vehicle was being operated illegally which 
would have permitted a stop under s.10(1)(d). His 
belief in a s.190 contravention was not reasonable; 
it was based on a misunderstanding of the law.  
 
Since the officer’s only reason for stopping the 
accused was erroneous, his “ignorance of the law 
could not provide reasonable cause for him to 
detain the [accused].” Nor could a judge use 
factors, although objective, that were not 
considered by the officer at the time of the stop. 
Justice Mitchell wrote: 
 
Detaining a person on the highway may be justified 
even though it does not result in any charge or 
conviction provided that prior to doing so the 
officer has reasonable cause to suspect the 
detainee is implicated in a violation of the HTA or 
the Criminal Code. However, here, prior to the 
detention, the officer had no basis to suspect a 
violation of the Criminal Code and should have 
known there was no violation of the HTA. A 
detention that would otherwise be unconstitutional 
cannot be rendered lawful on the basis of what was 
found after or as a result of it. Attempts to 
justify unconstitutional acts by that type of ex 
post facto analysis is repeatedly criticized by the 
Supreme Court of Canada…  
 
I disagree with [the P.E.I. Supreme Court] judge's 
statement…to the effect that a detention would 
be justified so long as grounds existed even though 
the officer did not utilize them in making his 
decision to stop the [accused]. In my view, the 
grounds must have existed in the mind of the 
officer and influenced his belief at the time of the 
detention otherwise his actions would not be 
justified. An officer could not afterwards rely on 
factors he did not consider as grounds at the time 
of the detention. A detention would be nonetheless 
arbitrary if it turns out the officer might have had 
grounds had he only taken into account certain 
other factors that existed but that he did not in 
fact consider at all. The question is whether the 
officer acted on reasonable grounds, not whether 
there were such grounds available. The purpose of 
s. 9 of the Charter is to prevent agents of the 
state from interfering with a person's freedom of 
movement without their acting on reasonable 
cause. Just as a police officer must satisfy him or 
herself that there are valid grounds for 
conducting a search before carrying it out, so too 
an officer must also satisfy him or herself that 
grounds exist for a detention before detaining. 
There is both a subjective and an objective aspect. 
The officer must have reasons for his belief, and 
those same reasons must be reasonably capable of 
supporting such belief. [references omitted, 
emphasis added] 
 
Justice McQuaid, in his dissenting judgment, 
disagreed with the majority. In his view, the 
officer was entitled to stop the accused under 
either s.10(1)(c) or (d) or on the basis of 
articulable cause. The officer did have a 
reasonable belief the accused contravened 
s.190(1) HTA even though a close reading of the 
section would have precluded a conviction. He also 
proceeded through the pedestrian crosswalk 
thereby jeopardizing public safety. As well, 
Justice McQuaid concluded that articulable 
cause, the minimum standard justifying state 
interference in a citizen’s right to move freely 
about, existed. He stated: 
 
The inference from all the evidence of the police 
officer is that while the incident at the crosswalk 
was the defining reason for the detention, the 
police officer had two additional reasons to be 
concerned the [accused] might be a public safety 
menace as he drove along Euston Street/Brighton 
Road. He was driving much slower than the posted 
speed limit and he was tentative in the use of his 
signalling devices. These two facts alerted the 
police officer to the operation of the motor 
vehicle and while they were not the reason he 
stopped the [accused], they constitute evidence 
the officer had an objective belief there was a 
public safety issue that would justify the 
detention of the [accused]. 
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 The purpose of s. 9 of the Charter is to allow 
citizens to move about freely without the threat 
of being detained by agents of the state in the 
absence of some reasonable belief they have 
violated the law. As [the Supreme Court judge] 
points out in…his reasons for judgment, an 
assessment of the police officer's reasonable 
belief that a vehicle is being operated contrary to 
the Highway Traffic Act does not require proof 
the police officer's belief be correct in that 
grounds must exist to charge and convict the 
driver for a violation of the Act. Drivers are 
stopped many times by police out of interest for 
public safety. Some are not charged with violations 
of the Act and even when they are charged with a 
violation, a conviction may not result because at law 
it was not possible to establish a violation. In those 
circumstances, the driver's rights under s.9 of the 
Charter could not be said to be violated as long as 
the police officer had a reasonable belief, founded 
on objective criteria, there was a violation or a 
public safety issue. 
 
In this context, it is useful to remember the right 
to move about in a motor vehicle is not a 
fundamental liberty. It is a licensed activity which, 
for the protection of the public, is subject to 
regulation and control. If a citizen is exercising his 
or her right to participate in this licensed activity 
in accord with the relevant law, the individual's 
right under s. 9 is to be respected. However, when 
an agent of the state has a reasonable belief this 
is not so and holds a reasonable belief there is a 
danger being posed to the public, the individual's 
right under s. 9 of the Charter yields to the right 
of the state to protect the public by the 
enforcement of the law. 
 
Despite Justice McQuaid’s opinion, the majority 
granted leave to appeal and the verdict of the 
trial judge excluding the certificates of analysis 
and acquitting the accused was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Experience is a hard teacher, because she gives 
the test first, the lesson afterwards” Vernon 
Sanders Law 
REQUEST FOR 
IDENTIFICATION DOES NOT 
NECESSARILY CREATE 
DETENTION 
R. v. C.R.H., 2003 MBCA 38 
 
Police officers on routine vehicle 
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accused and his two companions 
walking on the sidewalk in a 
residential neighbourhood. The police stopped 
abreast the three young men and one officer 
stated, “Hi, how’s it going? Where are you guys 
headed?”, through an open car window. The youths 
went over to the police car and were asked 
several questions including names, dates of births, 
addresses, and telephone numbers. At all times 
the police officers remained within their car. 
While one officer engaged the youths in casual 
conversation, the other officer queried the names 
on CPIC and it was learned the accused was 
breaching his probation curfew for which he was 
consequently arrested and charged.  
 
At trial for breach of probation, the Manitoba 
Provincial Court Judge ruled the accused had 
been arbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 of the 
Charter and his right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure under s.8 had 
been infringed when the police requested personal 
information in the form of identification and 
checked it on the computer. The evidence 
obtained by the police resulting from the stop 
was excluded. In his view, the accused was 
detained because it is to be presumed that a 
person is compelled to answer police questions 
unless there was evidence of informed consent. In 
particular, he concluded that a pedestrian 
stopped by police for a computer identity check is 
subject to “an atmosphere of oppression.”  
 
The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s bench. The appeal justice overturned the 
acquittal. In her view, the accused failed to 
demonstrate that there was any compulsion to 
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 comply with a direction or demand. There was no 
evidence of a command, order, or direction for 
the accused to approach the police car or to 
remain while the CPIC query was completed. Nor 
did the accused testify that he believed there 
was no option but to answer the police questions. 
Further, she ruled there was no s.8 Charter 
breach when the police ran the name on CPIC. The 
information in the police computer was not 
personal and the accused could not claim a privacy 
interest in his probation order that would exclude 
the right of police access. 
 
The accused appealed the Queen’s Bench 
judgment to the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
arguing that he was arbitrarily detained (s.9 
Charter), that he was not informed of his right to 
counsel (s.10(b) Charter), and that the request 
for identification and computer search violated 
his right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure (s.8 Charter).  
 
Detention 
 
Justice Steel, rendering the unanimous judgment 
for the Manitoba Court of Appeal, began the 
analysis by assessing whether there was a 
detention. Before the right to counsel under s.10 
is triggered or the arbitrariness of a detention is 
considered under s.9, it must be first determined 
that a detention in fact occurred. A detention 
under the Charter may occur in one of three 
ways: 
 
1. deprivation of liberty by physical restraint;  
 
2. state control through a direction or demand 
which prevents/impedes access to counsel and 
failure of non-compliance may result in 
significant legal consequences; or 
 
3. submitting to a state direction or demand in 
which the person reasonably perceives they 
have no choice but to comply, even though 
there is no criminal liability for failing to do 
so. This is commonly referred to as 
“psychological detention”. 
 
Justice Steel noted that the police may question 
anyone they believe may have information while 
investigating an offence, but cannot compel 
answers. However, “the mere fact of a 
conversation between a citizen and a police 
officer does not raise a presumption of 
detention.” The court must look beyond the fact 
of an officer/citizen encounter and examine the 
“entire relationship between the questioner and 
the person being questioned”, including the 
reasonableness of the person’s subjective belief. 
For example, “the personal circumstances of the 
accused, such as age, intelligence and level of 
sophistication” may be considered.  He wrote: 
 
The accused argues that the request for 
identification from police officers creates an 
inference that the accused reasonably believed he 
had no other choice but to comply.  At that point, 
it is submitted, the onus shifts onto the Crown to 
prove informed consent.  I do not agree.  There 
must be more than the request itself, even if it is 
from police officers and even if it is a request for 
identifying information.   
 
And further: 
 
We have not yet reached a situation where a 
compulsion to comply will be inferred simply 
because the request comes from a police officer or 
that a compulsion to respond should be presumed 
unless the Crown can show evidence of informed 
consent.  It is true that the very nature of the 
police function and the circumstances which often 
bring the police into contact with individuals 
introduce an element of authority into a request 
made by a police officer.  Certainly, there is a 
power imbalance between police and citizens, but 
that cannot mean that police can never ask 
questions.  Instead, the power imbalance should be 
one of the factors to be considered in an analysis 
of the interaction and a consequent determination 
of whether there was a compulsion to comply. 
[references omitted] 
 
Although “a pedestrian has the expectation of 
complete freedom of movement” where no crime 
has been committed or investigation is taking 
place, “so long as police officers merely question 
citizens and do not interfere with individual 
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 liberties by detaining them, such proactive 
policing should not be prohibited.” The Court 
concluded that there is no bright line rule that a 
detention can be assumed when the police 
approach a pedestrian. Since there was no 
detention, the right to counsel was not engaged 
nor was there a need to enquire into its 
arbitrariness. 
 
Search and Seizure 
 
In addressing the accused’s additional argument 
that the CPIC computer search violated his s.8 
Charter right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure, the Court held: 
 
The implications for law enforcement of a finding 
that access by the police to CPIC computer 
information engages Charter rights are significant.  
I do not need to enter into that discussion.  For 
the purposes of this case, I would dismiss this 
ground of appeal for substantially the same 
reasons as the summary conviction appeal judge.  
The accused's probation order was a public record, 
as was his criminal record information maintained 
by the police.   The place where the information 
was obtained was a computer maintained by the 
obtaining party itself; namely, the police service.  
The police database is not an area in which the 
accused can assert a privacy interest that would 
exclude the right of access of the police. 
 
In dismissing the appeal, Manitoba’s top court 
concluded that both the purpose and motive of 
the police must be considered in determining what 
impact the citizen/police interaction had on the 
person’s reasonable expectation to comply. It is 
incorrect to infer a presumption of compulsion 
simply because there was an encounter with 
police. As noted by Justice Steel, “the overall 
situation must be evaluated having regard to what 
is said and done, in what manner, in what location 
and for what purpose.” 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Law is mind without reason” Aristotle 384 B.C.-
322 B.C. 
SECTION 25 CRIMINAL CODE:  
A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code 
protects a police officer and anyone 
else acting lawfully, in using force to 
do what they are authorized or 
required by law to do.  This 
provision has also been referred to 
as the “Peace Officer” defence34.  
 
s.25(1) Criminal Code 
Every one who is required or authorized by law to do 
anything in the administration or enforcement of the 
law… (b) as a peace officer…is, if he acts on 
reasonable grounds, justified in doing what  he is 
required or authorized to do and in using as much 
force as is necessary for that purpose. 
 
Section 25 affords a qualified protection from 
liability for police officers using force while in 
the lawful execution of their duty. However, this 
provision does not in itself “provide authority for 
the use of force, it merely provides a defence 
that may be raised when the force used is 
challenged as unlawful”35.  
 
For example, in R. v. Brennan (1989) 52 C.C.C. (3d) 
366 (Ont.C.A.), an officer who ran a stop sign 
while pursuing a stolen vehicle argued he was 
entitled to disobey the sign under s.25(1). The 
question addressed by the Court was not whether 
the officer was required or authorized to 
apprehend the driver, but whether the officer 
was required or authorized to drive through the 
stop sign. In the absence of a statutory provision 
or common law authority to do so, the officer was 
not entitled to drive past the sign without 
stopping. In this sense, s.25 acts as a “shield” not 
a “sword”.  
 
Thus, the police must be authorized or required 
by statute or common law to undertake the action 
                                                 
34 R. v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, see also R. v. Devereaux (1996) 112 C.C.C. (3d) 243 
(Nfld.C.A.) 
35 R. v. Garcia-Guiterrez (1991) 65 C.C.C. (3d) 15 (B.C.C.A.) per Wood J.A., see also 
Eccles v. Bourque [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739. 
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 at issue (eg. arrest, detention, search, entry, 
etc.); if so, s.25 merely cloaks the officer with 
protection from criminal or civil liability36 when 
they use reasonable force in doing so. For 
example, police may use reasonable force, as 
necessary to overcome resistance to a lawful 
search, and to preserve from destruction any 
evidence that is properly the object of that 
search37. Similarly, s.495 of the Criminal Code 
“implicitly authorize[s] a police officer, acting on 
reasonable grounds, to use as much force as is 
necessary to effect an arrest”38; “the right to use 
reasonable force is, in the eyes of the law, simply 
part and parcel of the right to make an arrest”39. 
 
To be protected by s.25(1) of the Code, the 
following must be demonstrated40: 
 
[T]he force was used by a peace officer authorized 
by law to engage in law enforcement, that he acted 
on reasonable grounds, and that the force used was 
“necessary for [the] purpose.”  
 
In Hudson v. Brantford Police Services Board, 
(2001) Docket:C34963 (Ont.C.A.), justice 
Rosenberg for the Ontario Court of Appeal  held: 
 
[Section 25(1)] provides that a peace officer who 
is authorized by law to do something in the 
enforcement of the law is justified in doing what 
he or she is authorized to do if the officer “acts 
on reasonable grounds”. In effect, s.25(1) protects 
the officer from civil liability for reasonable 
mistakes of fact and justifies the use of force. It 
does not protect against reasonable mistakes of 
law, such as mistake as to the authority to commit 
a trespass to effect an arrest.[emphasis added] 
 
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Asante-Mensah (2001) Docket: C24828/C25026 
(Ont.C.A.) stated: 
 
[Section] 25 of the Criminal Code does not confer 
powers upon police officers or others, but rather 
shields them from civil or criminal prosecution if 
they act on reasonable grounds in the exercise of 
their authority and use reasonable force for that 
purpose. 
                                                 
                                                
36 Priestman v. Colangelo (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
37 R. v. Garcia-Guiterrez (1991) 65 C.C.C. (3d) 15 (B.C.C.A.) per Wood J.A. 
38 R. v. Leahey 2000 ABPC 198 
39 R. v. Asante-Mensah (2001) Docket: C24828/C25026 (Ont.C.A.) 
40 Mohamed v. City of Vancouver et al 2001 BCCA 290 
 
Using as much force as is necessary 
 
In assessing whether the level of force was 
reasonable, “it is the belief of the police officer 
in light of all the circumstances that is 
important.”41 Mere suspicion however, is 
insufficient.  There must be some level of 
objective grounds to support the officer's 
subjective decision to act; the cumulative effect 
of their observations, their knowledge of the 
subject(s) and the situation, information they 
have received, and their experience. Further, the 
police are not required to measure the amount of 
force with exactitude42. The Courts have 
recognized that there will be some consideration 
given to the amount of force used and whether it 
exceeded the reasonable amount necessarily 
required. The following quotes from various 
courts underscore this principle: 
 
In determining whether the amount of force used 
by the officer was necessary the jury must have 
regard to the circumstances as they existed at the 
time the force was used. They should have been 
directed that the [officer] could not be expected 
to measure the force used with exactitude. R. v. 
Bottrell (1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 211 B.C.C.A. 
 
It was necessary for the constable to strike hard 
enough to release the determined grip of the 
complainant on the handle of the door. To effect 
that result, the constable could not be expected to 
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of force 
necessary to achieve that result. R. v. Cline (1991), 
117 A.R. 4 (Alta C.A.) 
 
While according to the circumstances some 
allowance must be made for an officer in the 
exigencies of the moment misjudging the degree of 
force necessary to restrain a prisoner… Foster v. 
Pawsey & Draper (1980), 28 N.B.R. (2d) 334 
(N.B.Q.B.). 
 
In assessing [whether excessive force was used], I 
must bear in mind that the degree of force must 
be viewed from the subjective view of the police 
 
41 R. v. Bottrell (1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 211 B.C.C.A. 
42 R. v. Garcia-Guiterrez (1991) 65 C.C.C. (3d) 15 (B.C.C.A.) per Wood J.A. 
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 officers as well as the objective circumstances.  I 
must also make due allowance for a police officer 
in the exigencies of the moment misjudging the 
degree of force needed, and avoid holding a police 
officer to a standard of conduct that one sitting in 
the calmness of a courtroom later might determine 
was the best course. Stewart v. Canada [1999] 
F.C.J. No. 1996 (F.T.C.) appeal to Federal Court of 
Appeal [2001] FCA 128 dismissed. 
 
The right to use force must in each case depend 
upon its own circumstances, which must be 
considered to determine how they might be 
expected to act upon the mind and judgment of 
the officer, and to determine whether the officer 
was justified in using force. R. v. Purvis (1929) 51 
C.C.C. 273 (Ont.Co.Crt.) 
 
 Counsel argues that the physical force which was 
exhibited was out of proportion to the nature of 
the offence (a traffic related offence) which was 
at the heart of the matter.  While it is indeed 
unfortunate that the altercation in question 
occurred, the nature of the offence is not 
relevant.  Disputes over seemingly minor matters 
can at times raise emotions out of all proportion to 
the issue involved.  It is the circumstances in 
which the officer finds himself that are relevant 
for section 25(1) purposes.  Dyer v. Canada [1992] 
F.C.J. No. 238 (F.T.C.) 
 
Summary 
 
To be justified in using force generally, a police 
officer must establish: 
 
• they were required or authorized by law to 
act in the administration or enforcement of 
the law (acting in the lawful execution of 
their duties); 
• they were acting on reasonable grounds; and 
• they used no more force that was reasonably 
necessary   
 
In short, the use of force must be necessary and 
proportionate in the circumstances43. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Mohamed v. City of Vancouver et al 2001 BCCA 290 
SPONTANEOUS RESPONSE TO 
ALLEGATION NOT 
ELICITATION 
R. v. Gitsadig, 2003 ABCA 91 
 
The accused, a taxi driver, was 
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April 2003 arrested for the sexual assault 
of a passenger after she 
reported the incident and the 
number of his cab to police. At the time of his 
arrest he was advised of his right to counsel and 
cautioned about providing a statement. He asked 
to speak to a lawyer and was transported to the 
police station where he was placed in a room with 
a telephone, telephone books, and was advised 
that a list of telephone numbers for duty counsel 
were available. As the officer turned to leave the 
room, the accused asked what the allegations 
were. After the officer told him, the accused 
stated he remembered the female passenger but 
that there was no physical contact between them. 
During the voire dire to determine the 
admissibility of this statement, the judge 
concluded there was no  violation of his right to 
counsel under s.10(b) and even if there had been 
the statement would be admissible under s.24(2). 
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing he had not been given the 
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel 
before he gave his statement. In dismissing his 
appeal, Justice Fruman for the unanimous court 
rejected this submission stating: 
 
34
The trial judge correctly found that the 
[accused’s] s. 10( b) Charter rights had not been 
violated. The [accused] gave a very short, 
spontaneous statement when told of the 
allegations against him. He had been chartered and 
cautioned and indicated he understood his rights. 
His statement was not elicited in any way by the 
police officer, nor did she continue the interview. 
She did not question him, but merely provided 
information to him in response to his question 
about the nature of the charges against him. The 
[accused’s] statement was brief and the police 
officer had no notice that he was going to give it 
 and no means of stopping him from speaking. She 
had no opportunity to provide a Prosper [[1994] 3 
S.C.R. 236] warning, nor was one called for. 
 
Finally, even if a breach could be found, the trial 
judge was correct that, at best, it was a technical 
breach that could not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
POLICE NEED NOT PLAY WORD 
GAMES OVER RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
R. v. Matkea, 2003 ABQB 27 
 
A police officer pulled the 
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speaking to a lawyer] would have ended any dubious 
nature of the first comment that was made by the 
individual. Especially having regard to the fact that 
the first comment was not made that he wanted to 
speak to counsel, or that he had any contemplation 
about doing so; but that in fact he wasn’t sure yet, 
or he hadn’t made up his mind yet, or whatever he 
meant by the expressions that he used there. 
 
Under the circumstances, I do not find any 
violation of a holding off requirement here, 
because as I said before, the Constable did not 
attempt to obtain self-incriminatory evidence, 
prior to an answer, No. Once he got the answer, 
No, and then the cooperation of the [accused] 
after that, it seems to me that there was not any 
violation of the right to counsel, or the right to 
have a reasonable opportunity to exercise it. 
 
V
Aaccused over after he was 
observed weaving a homemade 
go-cart on the roadway at 
pproximately 30 km/h. The officer could smell 
lcohol and the accused responded that he had 
een drinking when questioned. He was arrested 
nd advised of his right to counsel. When asked, 
Do you want to call duty counsel, or any other 
awyer?” he replied, “I don’t know yet.” He was 
hen given the police caution. The accused was 
hen transported to the police station and again 
sked if he wished to contact a lawyer. He 
eplied, “No.” At trial the accused was convicted 
f an alcohol related driving offence under s.253 
f the Criminal Code.  
owever, he appealed to the Alberta Court of 
ueen’s Bench arguing, in part, that his right to 
ounsel under s.10(b) of the Charter had been 
iolated. He submitted that when he first 
mbiguously answered, “I don’t know yet”, the 
fficer failed to fulfill his obligation in holding 
ff from eliciting evidence (breath samples) until 
urther efforts were made to determine full and 
roper waiver. Queen’s Bench Justice Watson 
isagreed. In his view, the police are “not 
equired to play word games with a detainee, 
nder circumstances such as this”. He held: 
It seems to me that [answering “No” at the police 
station to the officer’s second question about 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
SLEEPING DRIVER REBUTS 
PURPOSE OF OCCUPYING 
OPERATOR’s SEAT 
R. v. Shuparski, 2003 SKCA 22 
 
At 12:07 am a police officer 
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pril 2003 found the accused asleep in his 
vehicle at the roadside. He was 
reclined in the driver’s seat with 
the keys on the front passenger seat. The engine 
was off and the vehicle was in park. He exhibited 
signs of impairment, was arrested, and given the 
breath demand. He subsequently provided breath 
samples at 2:50 am and 3:12 am in excess of the 
legal limit and was charged with care and control 
while impaired and over 80mg%. At trial, the 
accused testified that about 10 minutes after 
leaving his girlfriend’s home at midnight he was 
feeling fatigued and unsafe to drive because he 
was tired and had been drinking. He pulled off the 
road, put his vehicle in park, placed the keys on 
the seat, locked the doors, reclined his seat, and 
fell asleep.  
 
The Saskatchewan Provincial Court judge 
acquitted the accused of the impaired charge 
because she had a reasonable doubt as to his 
35
 impairment. On the over 80mg% charge, she was 
satisfied his blood alcohol content was over the 
limit and that he was both in actual care and 
control (presented a present danger to resume 
driving) and presumptive care and control (he 
never abandoned the purpose to set the vehicle in 
motion even though he intended to sleep for 
awhile). She would have convicted him but for the 
prior judicial decision of the Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen’s Bench she felt bound to follow in R. v. 
Sherbrook, [1998] 6 W.W.R. 602 (Sask.Q.B.). In 
her view, the rationale barring her from 
convicting the accused was as follows44: 
 
[With reference to the presumption found in 
s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code] the time to 
assess the accused's purpose is when he or she is 
found by the police, and if asleep at that time, 
when he or she went to sleep… The essence of the 
decision regarding the presumption is that the 
making of a conscious decision to sleep in the 
vehicle for awhile constitutes an abandonment of 
occupation of the driver's seat for the purpose of 
setting the vehicle in motion.  The intention to 
resume driving at a later time is not sufficient to 
establish that the accused occupied the driver's 
seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in 
motion.   
……… 
[With reference to actual care and control] the 
Queen's Bench ruling was that, as a matter of law, 
a person who stops driving and intends to sleep, 
and then to resume driving when he is of the view 
he has sobered up enough to do so has only a 
future intention to drive.  This does not constitute 
care or control at the time he is found asleep in 
the vehicle by the police, if the vehicle is not 
running and in the absence of some other evidence 
that the accused has "...performed some act or 
series of acts involving the use of the car, its 
fittings or equipment" ….  The decision precludes a 
finding that an intention to resume driving at a 
later time coupled with a present ability to set the 
vehicle in motion is de facto care or control. 
[references omitted]  
 
Thus the accused was acquitted. A Crown appeal 
of the trial judge’s decision was dismissed. The 
Crown further appealed, this time to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.  
                                                 
44 see R. v. Shuparski [2001] S.J. No. 220 (Sask.Prov.Crt) 
 
Impaired Care & Control Principles 
 
Chief Justice Bayda, for the 2:1 majority and 
concurred in by the dissenting justice, first 
outlined four sets of principles respecting alcohol 
related driving offences: 
 
1. The offence of operating a motor vehicle over 
80mg% is a separate and distinct offence 
from care and control of a motor vehicle, in 
motion or not, while over 80mg%. Each has its 
own mens rea and actus rea.  
 
2. The mens rea of care and control “is the 
intent to assume care and control after the 
voluntary consumption of alcohol or a drug.45”  
Intent to drive or set the vehicle in motion is 
not required. 
 
3. The actus reus of care and control is “acts 
which involve some use of the car or its 
fittings and equipment, or some course of 
conduct associated with the vehicle which 
would involve a risk of putting the vehicle in 
motion so that it could become dangerous” 
after the voluntary consumption of alcohol 
has produced in the person's blood a 
concentration of alcohol that exceeds 80mg%.  
 
4. The Crown may prove care and control either 
by proving actual (non-presumptive or de 
facto) care and control or by relying on the 
presumption found in s.258(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code which deems the person 
occupying the driver’s seat in care and control 
of the motor vehicle.  
 
s.258(1)(a) Criminal Code 
…where it is proved that the accused occupied the seat 
or position ordinarily occupied by a person who 
operates a motor vehicle…the accused shall be deemed 
to have had the care and control of the vehicle…unless 
the accused established that the accused did not 
occupy that seat or position for the purpose of setting 
the vehicle…in motion 
                                                 
45 R. v. Toews [1985] 2 S.C.R. 119 
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 Under this section however, it remains open to 
the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that they did not occupy the seat for the purpose 
of setting the vehicle in motion. If the accused is 
successful in rebutting the presumption, the 
Crown must prove care and control beyond a 
reasonable doubt through the non-presumptive 
means.    
 
Under s.258(1)(c) of the Code, the results of 
breath samples taken pursuant to a demand are 
proof of blood alcohol concentration at the time 
of the driving or care and control provided the 
first sample was taken within two hours of the 
offence. 
 
s.258(1)(c) Criminal Code 
…where samples of the breath of the accused have 
been taken pursuant to a demand…if (ii) each sample 
was taken as soon as practicable after the time when 
the offence was alleged to have been committed and, in 
the case of the first sample, not later than two hours 
after that time…evidence of the results of the 
analyses so made is, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, proof that the concentration of alcohol in the 
blood of the accused at the time when the offence was 
alleged to have been committed… 
 
In other words, the Crown can only rely on a 
certificate of analysis under s.258(1)(c) if it 
could be proven, either by relying on the 
presumption or proving actual care and control, 
that the accused was in fact in care and control 
within two hours of the taking of the first 
sample. Since the first sample was taken at 2:50 
am, the care and control offence would have to 
occur within the “critical overlap” period -- 
between 12:50 am (2 hours before the first 
sample) and 2:07 am (the time the officer found 
the accused) -- in order for the Crown to use the 
two hour presumptive window provided by 
s.258(1)(c). Thus, the accused’s purpose in 
occupying the driver’s seat between 12:50 am and 
2:07 am was critical. He testified that his 
purpose in occupying the driver’s seat during this 
crucial period was to sleep, not to set the vehicle 
in motion. 
 
Can the purpose for occupation change 
without vacating the driver’s seat? 
 
Even though the accused was driving the vehicle 
before he pulled over to fall asleep, his purpose 
changed. It was not necessary for him to vacate 
the driver’s seat to change his purpose for 
occupying it. Justice Bayda held: 
 
A requirement that the [accused] vacate the 
driver's seat in order to change the purpose for 
occupying it is not merely unreasonable, but 
nonsensical. To require that physical act hardly 
fits the pattern for the way the human mind makes 
decisions. And of course, to acquire a "purpose" is 
to make a decision, to perform a mental act. 
Consider this example: A person gets into the 
driver's seat of his car to listen to his CD stereo. 
He has no other purpose. He then makes a 
deliberate decision to fall asleep. He turns off his 
stereo, remains in his seat, but reclines it and falls 
asleep. Is it rational to say that his purpose 
throughout was to listen to the stereo even after 
he turned it off and fell asleep? Surely, his 
purpose changed when he decided to turn off the 
stereo and fall asleep. It is nonsensical to suggest 
he first had to vacate the driver's seat to change 
purposes. Suppose when he woke up he decided to 
again listen to the stereo. Can it be said that his 
purpose then was to sleep? Hardly. Can it be said 
that his purpose throughout this entire period was 
to listen to the stereo even when it was turned off 
and he was asleep? Again, hardly. I find that 
whatever purpose a person has for originally 
occupying the driver's seat (e.g. when he first gets 
into the vehicle) that purpose may change at any 
time the person decides to change it. He does not 
need to vacate the seat to change purpose. 
 
Can more than one purpose exist 
simultaneously? 
 
The majority of the court concluded that a 
person can have more than one purpose at any 
given time, but consideration must be given to the 
“controlling or dominant purpose”. The majority 
stated: 
 
The statute speaks to "the" purpose. That 
connotes either one purpose and if there should be 
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 more than one, the controlling or dominant purpose. 
In other words, a person occupying the driver's 
seat could have a dominant or controlling purpose 
and also one or more incidental, inchoate or 
contingent purposes. Those latter purposes, by 
definition, are neither dominant nor controlling and 
do not qualify for "the" purpose. Any one of them 
may qualify as "a" purpose, but that is not the way 
the statute is worded. 
 
Is purpose outside the crucial time 
period relevant? 
 
Finally, the majority found that the purpose for 
occupying the driver’s seat outside the critical 
overlap period could provide proof of the sole or 
dominant purpose inside the critical overlap 
period if the occupation continues without 
interruption. In this case, the accused’s purpose 
in occupying the driver’s seat changed from 
driving home to falling asleep. He accomplished 
the changed purpose by stopping his vehicle, 
putting it in park, turning off the engine, taking 
the keys out of the ignition, reclining the seat, 
and falling asleep.  At this moment, his actions 
were entirely inconsistent with “the purpose of 
setting the vehicle in motion.” It would be absurd 
to suggest that, while asleep, he again changed his 
purpose to one of setting the vehicle in motion 
when he awoke. Justice Bayda wrote: 
 
A sleeping person is unconscious and cannot perform 
the mental act of acquiring a new purpose. Even if he 
had a broad general intention before he fell asleep to 
drive home after he was awake and refreshed, and 
even if that broad general intention may be 
construed and narrowed to a particular purpose for 
occupying the driver's seat, then at that critical 
point it was not the controlling or dominant purpose 
for occupying the driver's seat. At most, it was a 
contingent, inchoate or incidental purpose, but not 
"the" purpose. 
 
The accused successfully established that during 
the critical overlap period (12:50 am to 2:07 am) 
he did not occupy the driver’s seat to set the 
vehicle in motion. Thus, he had rebutted the 
presumption found in s.258(1)(a). The Crown also 
failed to prove the actus reus of actual (non 
presumptive) care and control. The only act during 
the critical overlap period was sleeping. There 
was no “risk of putting the vehicle in motion so 
that it could become dangerous”.  The accused 
was sleeping in a parked vehicle with the engine 
off and the keys on the seat. Justice Bayda held: 
 
Whether a potential for dangerousness should be a 
cause for concern where a person is in a "position" 
to set a vehicle in motion depends not so much on 
the physical "position" the person happens to be in 
as it does on his attitude or disposition towards 
potential dangerous situations. If it is nonchalant, 
non-caring or reckless, that is one thing. If the 
attitude is to specifically address the situation 
with a view to eliminating it, that is quite another 
thing. In the present case, the [accused’s] 
deliberate rational decision, after he realized his 
driving may be creating a dangerous situation, to 
stop his driving in order to sleep is strong evidence 
of his attitude to potential dangerous situations: 
It is an attitude towards eliminating those 
situations after a realization takes hold. Given that 
attitude, it is unlikely that after eliminating one 
potential dangerous situation, he would be apt to 
create a new dangerous situation by driving after 
he awoke if he was unfit to drive. In other words, 
when the facts of the case are viewed from an 
"overall" perspective that element of 
dangerousness that is central to all of these care 
or control cases was not present in this case, which 
is to say the Crown failed to prove this element of 
the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The majority dismissed the Crown’s appeal. 
 
A different view 
 
Justice Jackson, in dissent, took a different view. 
With respect to actual care and control he 
concluded that “the case law permits a court to 
find danger where an individual enters a vehicle 
for the purpose of driving it and decides to sleep. 
The risk that [they] might set the vehicle in 
motion upon awakening is sufficient to prove the 
risk and dangerousness necessary for the actus 
reus of care and control.” He stated: 
 
A risk of putting the vehicle in motion, and the 
possibility of danger emanating therefrom, are 
almost always present with these facts, i.e., a 
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 person over .08 enters a vehicle to drive and then 
decides not to drive but to sleep. I use the word 
"almost" because I cannot foresee all possible fact 
situations, but on the facts of this appeal, there 
was an increased risk, and therefore, an increased 
danger that the accused would drive because he 
had already done so and he still needed to do so to 
get himself home. This is an anticipation of harm, 
but the criminal law addresses itself not just to 
actual harm but to the creation of offences 
prohibiting behaviour which can lead to physical 
harm or property loss. 
 
If a court cannot find dangerousness in this 
situation, one would have to conclude that impaired 
drivers in the circumstances of this case are no 
hazard. This would not seem to be correct…. It is 
trite to say, but no less true, that we discourage 
people from entering the driver's seat because 
persons who are impaired cannot accurately assess 
the extent of their own impairment and may 
believe they are sober enough to drive when they 
are not. 
……… 
Since an accused does not have to "intend to drive" 
when the court is considering actual care or 
control, this must mean that dangerousness…can be 
found where there is only a risk of driving with no 
immediate intention to drive…. 
 
While the intention to drive does not form part of 
the mens rea of the offence of actual care or 
control, it does not mean that intention has no role 
to play in determining whether the actus reus of 
the offence is present. The intention to drive can 
be relevant to determine whether there is a risk 
of setting the vehicle in motion from which danger 
may arise. 
 
With respect to relying on the presumption found 
in s.258(1)(a), Justice Jackson was of the opinion 
that a court must consider all of the surrounding 
circumstances, including past and present reasons 
for the accused’s presence in the driver’s seat as 
well as the vehicle’s operability. Furthermore, a 
court can infer from the person’s actions whether 
they had more than one purpose for occupying the 
driver’s seat, including setting the vehicle in 
motion.  
 
[The accused] occupied the driver's seat of his 
vehicle. The trial judge found his intention to drive 
continued into the period of sleep, which means he 
could not establish he did not occupy the driver's 
seat for the purpose of setting it in motion. He is, 
therefore, deemed to be in care or control under 
clause 258(1)(a). Since the Crown proved the 
prohibited level of blood/alcohol concentration at 
the time of discovery, [the accused] must be found 
guilty. 
 
Justice Jackson would have allowed the appeal, 
directed a guilty verdict, and remitted sentencing 
back to the trial judge.  
  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
UPCOMING APPEAL 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada 
has granted leave in the appeal 
of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
judgment in R. v. Mann, 2002 
MBCA 121 (see Volume 2, Issue 10 of this 
publication). In that case, Manitoba’s top court 
ordered a new trial after a provincial court judge 
excluded evidence obtained after police searched 
a detainee’s pocket during an investigative 
detention and found marihuana.  Justice Twaddle, 
writing for the unanimous Manitoba Court of 
Appeal, concluded that the police were acting 
within the scope of their common law duties of 
preventing crime and protecting life and property 
when they detained a suspect matching the 
description of a break and enter suspect. 
Furthermore, a security search of the detainee’s 
pullover pouch for safety purposes was necessary 
to carry out these duties and involved a minimal 
interference with personal integrity. This will be 
the first time the Supreme Court of Canada deals 
head-on with searches incidental to investigative 
detention. 
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 2003 NATIONAL FIELD 
TRAINING CONFERENCE 
JUNE 1-5, 2003 
Scottsdale, AZ 
 
The National Association of 
Field Training Officers 
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members/$375 for non-members). A block of 
rooms has been set aside, on a first come first 
serve basis, at a very reasonable rate of $69 per 
night if booked prior to May 1, 2003.  
 
Topics scheduled for this year’s conference, 
presented by a compliment of high quality and 
professional speakers, include: 
 
V
A(NAFTO) is an educational and 
professional association 
concerned with apprenticeship 
training (commonly referred to 
as the Field Training Officer 
oncept) for Law Enforcement, Communications, 
nd Corrections personnel. Educators, 
dministrators and other Criminal Justice 
ractitioners are also encouraged to participate. 
he concept of NAFTO was formalized with its 
ncorporation as a non-profit organization in 
alifornia in 1991 and was reorganized/ relocated 
n 1993 to a more central location in Colorado. 
he goals of NAFTO include: 
. To promote and foster mutual cooperation 
between Field Training Officers (FTO), other 
members of their agencies, private industry 
and the public; 
. To provide a forum for the exchange of ideas 
and techniques;  
. To conduct training seminars and conferences 
in FTO Program related issues;  
. To research educational methodology so that 
improvements may be made in the areas of 
teaching and learning;  
. To educate the membership and the public 
regarding apprenticeship training;  
. To keep the membership, agencies and the 
public informed of legislative and statutory 
changes and their influence on field training.  
his year’s conference is being held in 
cottsdale, Arizona from Sunday, June 1 to 
hursday, June 5, 2003 at the Chaparral Suites 
otel (www.chaparralsuites.com). Cost of the 
onference is $315 for members and $355 for 
on-members. These costs will rise for 
egistration received after May 1st ($335 for 
• FTO’s Role in Mentoring Our New Warriors 
• Policing with Integrity 
• The C’s of Leadership 
• Investigating Officer Complaints 
• Use of Force Investigations 
• The Warrior, Fear, and Courage 
• Recognizing and Implementing Change 
• Teaching Leadership Development 
• Training in the Rolling Classroom 
• The Implications of Response Time in Survival 
Skills Training 
 
For more information on the NAFTO conference, 
check out their website at www.nafto.org or 
contact NAFTO’s Executive Director, Lt. Glen 
Miller at:  
 
NAFTO 
PO Box 259565  
Madison, WI  
53725-9565 
Telephone: (608) 222-5727  
Fax: (608) 222-5730   
Email: info@nafto.org  
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